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Chapter 1: Introduction

Violence and politics are inherently intertwined concepts. One can often be a
catalyst for the other; violence can be used to achieve desired political outcomes, and
politics can be used to end conflict. An effective political system can disincentivise the
use of violence, while an ineffective one can encourage it. Within this analysis, I attempt
to explore the relationship between security concerns and political development in three
case studies: Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Senegal. These three countries have similar
colonial histories, similar independence processes, though Guinea did become
independent two years earlier, and are all located in the same region. Importantly, each
country has come into existence relatively recently, between 1958 and 1960, and has thus
gone through large political developments throughout its existence as it has adapted from
the initial institutions set up by independence leaders. Each case study has predictably
had quite different paths in both political development and security threats, and an
entirely different relationship between these two concepts.
Before delving into the separate case studies, it is prudent to first discuss briefly
the concept of security within this paper. Security within the developing world is
naturally different than the traditional view of security found within the western world.
The traditional view of national or state security is understood in terms of the physical
protection of states from external threats, including war, border conflicts, espionage,
sabotage, subversion and other threats that could be operationalized by actual or potential
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adversaries.1 In the developing world, these security threats can be augmented by
regional insecurity and weakness of the state’s military powers, which heightens external
vulnerabilities. However, the discussions of security crises in the following analysis will
focus almost exclusively on internal security concerns, not external threats.
In analyzing security in the developing world, it is useful to change the analysis
from a power or capability centric metric, such as weapons capabilities or military size,
and move towards a metric that is based more on sociopolitical cohesiveness, as
presented by Barry Buzan in his paper “People, States, and Fear: The National Security
Problem in the Third World.” Buzan separates states into four categories: very weak
states, ordinary weak states, middle ground states, and strong states. Very weak states are
the typical definition of an anarchical state, with neither a widely accepted nor coherent
idea of the state among the population, and no governing power strong enough to impose
unity in the absence of a political consensus. 2 Ordinary weak states, which I argue
contains the three states within this analysis, generally contain a governing power that
can override a domestic environment where political identities are more strongly tied
towards tribal, ethnic, political, or religious groups than to the state itself. 3 Middle ground
states contain a widespread identification among the people of the idea and institutions of
the state, yet still contain strong political identities that can occasionally clash violently
with the central government. 4 Strong states contain a synthesis of state and society, a
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difficult trait to develop in the relatively newly inaugurated states found in French West
Africa.
When looking at security concerns related to sociopolitical cohesiveness over
aspects of power itself, security risks move from external threats to threats to the
sociopolitical climate within the state: political violence, major changes in the structure
of political institutions, visible use of force by the state in domestic life, large role for
political police in everyday situations, major political conflict over state ideology, lack of
a coherent national identity or the presence of competing national identities, lack of a
clear hierarchy for political authority, and a high degree of state control over the media. 5
On the weaker end of the spectrum for sociopolitical cohesiveness, the concept of
security can become entangled with the idea of state or regime security. Big concerns
within the regime security specter include military coups, guerilla movements,
secessionist movements, mass uprisings, and political factionalism.6 Since many threats
posed are threats to the governing power’s ability to continue its hold on power, it is easy
to treat the two terms as synonymous. However, within this analysis, while issues of
regime security do count as a security crisis, the focus of security concerns will be more
heavily based on insecurity for the population within a country. The internal instability of
a regime collapse or threat of collapse will have very negative effects for the safety of the
citizens, and will be included in the discussion for this reason. Also included lens when
the safety of the citizenry is the focus is also the abuses of the government on their own
populace, as we will see within the Guinea and Senegal case studies.
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Similar to the concept of security, it is also necessary to describe what political
development alludes to within this analysis, as it can be an equally vague term with a
multitude of valid definitions. Generally speaking, political development is the analysis
of the trends of change of political institutions within this country. In this work, the focus
will be on how the political development has changed specifically in terms of public
participation and the ability of the citizens to have an input or control in their governance,
as well as how much governing institutions evolve to benefit the population rather than
focusing on, say, solidifying and maintaining power. As well, political stability and
durability are also important factors. Included within this analysis of political
development is the fostering of civil society, presence of opposition parties, electoral
processes, and how the country handles period of political uncertainty, such as matters of
succession.
Using these metrics, this paper will first analyze the foundations of political
institutions within the three states by exploring the creation of nationalist leaders in the
pre-independence era, and how their personal development within these years affected
their governance style after independence. Afterwards, the discussion will separate into
the three distinct case studies. The purpose of this analysis is to first outline the major
developments within each country in the political field, highlight the major security
concerns within the country, and then analyze how these two sectors have affected the
other, or if they have not, why there has been little connection between the two.

6

Chapter 2: Colonial Administration

The rise of African involvement in colonial political administration exploded after
the end of the second World War, when France opened up the territorial government to
include more input from Africans themselves. In these postwar years, the French political
system in the colonies evolved away from the direct, authoritarian rule of the pre-war
French colonial administration to become more closely related to a parliamentary system.
Charles de Gaulle expressed this administrative evolution at the Brazzaville conference in
1944: “We are certain that there will be no progress if the peoples who live on their
native land cannot profit from it both materially and morally, if this development does
not bring them more closely associated with the directions of their own affairs.” 7 From
the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s, Africans gained rights to electoral politics, trade-union
organization, and more universal citizenship.8 These transformations allowed African
voters to elect delegates to the National Assembly, to the Assembly of the French Union,
to the Grand Councils in Dakar and Brazzaville, and to the territorial assemblies. By
1958, voters had expressed their opinions on four referenda, two constitutions, three
National Assemblies, and three territorial assemblies. African representatives were able
to twice elect members to the Assembly of the French Union, thrice to the federal grand
council, and thrice to the French Senate. 9 While representation by Africans was still
relatively modest—for example, in the 1945 convention of the Constitutional Assembly,
Ernest Milcent, “Senegal,” in African One-Party States, ed. Gwendolyn M. Carter (New York: Cornell
University Press, 1962), 95.
8
Patrick Manning, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1880-1995 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 139.
9
Manning. Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, 140.
7
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only 6 Africans represented the 18 million French West African population—these
changes did represent the first time that the colonial regime allowed French Africans to
contribute to the institutions that directed their lives. 10
Following the opening of political participation in the colonies, there soon
developed dominant African personalities in colonial politics. As territorial assemblies
became more powerful and the number of African political groups increased, the future
leaders of the soon-to-be independent African states gained invaluable political
experience and developed their political following throughout their maneuvering within
the individual territories as well as through the interterritorial politics of the French West
African administrative stage. The three dominant political figures in Guinea, Senegal and
Côte D’Ivoire post-independence—Sékou Touré, Léopold Senghor, and Félix
Houphouët-Boigny, respectively—all developed their bases of support and gained key
political experience through their political activities in the pre-independence years.
Léopold Sédar Senghor, the head of the nationalist movement in Senegal, and subsequent
first president of Senegal, entered politics as one of the first African representatives to be
elected in the National Assembly in 1945. He was previously unknown in Senegalese
political circles, and a curious personality to enter the Senegalese nationalist movement,
“a forty-year-old university teacher who had lived in France for nearly twenty years, who
had acquired a French wife and citizenship, and whose claim to prominence was his
reputation as one of France’s leading young poets, hardly seemed the man who would
come to master brokerage politics with a subtlety and skill matched by few other African
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leaders.”11 Senghor had many identities: African and French intellectual, “man of the
bush”, Serer, political animal. He rose in prominence as a political leader after founding
his own political party, the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS), to oppose the thendominant Senegalese section of the French Socialist Party, SFIO, which was led by
Lamine Guèye.12 Senghor’s politics were always heavily based in his political
philosophy, which envisioned a society that combined European technology and African
communal values to create a more humanistic socialism.13 Senghor was a master of
balancing his various identities to connect with many different groups in Senegal, from
the rural peasants to the urban elites. However, he had no interest in creating a single,
unified movement for nationalism in Senegal—something which would have been more
difficult in the extremely diversified and competitive tribal society found within the
territory—and instead focused his energies into brokerage politics, balancing the different
forces under the overarching umbrella of BDS.
Côte D’Ivoire’s Houphouët-Boigny was an early political leader, and maintained
his strong control and influence in Ivoirian politics through to his death in 1993. Less
outwardly passionate than many of the other African leaders, “his quiet self-assurance
helped to bring people around to his view. But it was the fact that he could point to what
he had accomplished, the abolition of forced labor, the bringing about of reconciliation
with the French administration, and then the long string of successful economic projects,
that steadily built up his reputation as the supernaturally ‘wise of man’ of the country.” 14

J. Cartwright, Political Leadership in Africa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 126
Milcent, “Senegal,” 97.
13
Cartwright, Political Leadership, 127.
14
Ibid., 102.
11
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He first entered politics after founding Côte D’Ivoire’s earliest political party, the
Syndicat Africain Agricole (SAA), to defend the rights of smaller African farmers against
the interests of the large French agricultural companies. Houphouët grew the SAA into an
effective political coalition, changing the smaller, narrowly focused political party into
the nationalist Parti Démocratique de la Côte D’Ivoire (PDCI), which was the Ivoirian
branch of the dominant French West African political coalition, the Rassemblement
Démocratique Africain (RDA). Houphouët developed the PDCI into an extremely
efficient political organization, with local cells throughout the region, excellent
communications, and an ability to mobilize supporters quickly. 15 As a representative in
the French Constituent Assembly, Houphouët’s passage of a bill to abolish forced labor
in the overseas territories—a minor issue for metropolitan France, but hugely important
to the African population—along with his entrance into the National Assembly,
catapulted him into prominence in both thIvoirian politics and the interterritorial RDA
movement.16 In the initial stages of his political activity, Houphouët strongly allied the
RDA with the French Communist Party, leading to harassment from the anti-Communist
French. This included the imprisonment of activists, banning of the party’s right to
association, bribing of prominent figures within the organization, and even falsifying of
elections.17 This persecution gave Houphouët a stronger status as a nationalist leader,
“French repression further enhanced Houphouet-Boigny’s heroic stature. Not only had he
fought for and won African rights, but in doing so he had not been arrested, and this had
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showed himself to be as powerful as the Frenchmen. With these credentials, he could
afford to compromise with the French and yet remain secure from most attacks.” 18 And
compromise he did. After years of harassment, Houphouët decided that the benefits of the
alliance with the Communists had come to an end and reconfigured the party’s
associations with the French metropole, establishing strong connections to the French
government and business community. This ushered in in a honeymoon period for
relations between France and Côte D’Ivoire, leading the colony to financial security, even
outdistancing Senegal in economic development. 19 Houphouët’s willingness to radically
alter the party did not reflect his compliance with the French government, but rather his
focus on achieving his vision for Côte D’Ivoire, a vision that was heavily motivated by
economic stability and growth.
Whereas descriptions of Houphouët-Boigny comment on his lack of outward
passion and charisma, the first president of Guinea, Sékou Touré, was able to cement his
popularity through his fiery and eloquent presence in the political field. Out of the three
political leaders mentioned within this analysis, Touré was the most revolutionary:
The characteristic which first brought him to prominence and gave him support
among the people was his courage and readiness to defy the Europeans, whether
these were French colonialist, American or Russian…. Coupled with his dynamic
style, his forceful oratory, a skill in organizing urban workers and a reputation for
personal integrity despite his frequent tactical shifts, these qualities gave him a
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Cartwright, Political Leadership, 101-102.
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powerful appeal to Guineans…. Young, handsome and dynamic, Sékou Touré
was one of the few African nationalist leaders who were genuinely charismatic. 20
Touré was outspoken about the negative effects of colonialism. For him, the biggest evil
to come out of the colonial regime was the destruction of the basic values of African
society and the rise of self-interest over solidarity. 21 Touré gained prominence as the head
of the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG), the Guinean branch of the RDA. His
beginning in politics was not seamless; his association with the RDA began during the
years of harassment from the French administration over the party’s affiliation with the
French Communists. This combined with the limits of political organization in Guinea at
the time—which was centered on organizing for the purpose of getting elected, but not
for long-term, ideological objectives like that of Touré’s nationalistic party—meant that
Touré’s, and the PDG’s, popularity did not develop until into the mid-1950s.22 Several
factors led to the emergence of Touré as the head political figure within the country. The
attacks from the French administration on his political party eventually had similar
effects as that of Côte D’Ivoire, giving the party a stronger image of rebelling against the
French in the interest of African rights. This, along with victorious labor movements led
by the politician, including a successful two-month strike to increase the minimum-wage,
heightened the positive connotation of Touré and the PDG with Guineans. 23 As France
moved into the Fourth Republic, Touré and the PDG had become hugely influential in
Guinean politics, dominating elections and the political discourse within the country.

20

Cartwright, Political Leadership, 194.
L. Gray Cowan, “Guinea,” in African One-Party States, ed. Gwendolyn M. Carter (New York: Cornell
University Press, 1962), 154-155.
22
Cowan, “Guinea,” 159-160.
23
Cartwright, Political Leadership, 198.
21

12

With the beginning of the leftist regime of Guy Mollet in France, the French
metropole’s relationship to the overseas territories was again reconsidered. In 1956, the
loi cadre was developed, a further liberalization of the indigenous political powers of the
African territories. The law increased the power of the territorial assemblies, which had
previously been largely advisory, established executive councils in each territory, and
implemented universal suffrage for Africans. 24 This liberalization, while progressive, was
not revolutionary enough to keep up with the rapid development of the African political
evolution. By the time the law became effective, the political scene in the territories
realized the inefficiencies and disadvantages of the law to the further development of
political autonomy for French Africa. 25 In Senegal, these reforms were received with
hesitancy. The acquisition of a “semiautonomous” status and expansion of powers in the
colonial administrations were beneficial to Senghor and BDS. Yet, Senghor’s vision for
the African future was constructed around a strong federation between the various
territories, and with the loi cadre’s advancement of power at the territorial level, and
subsequent reduction of power at the federal level, any possibility of building a base for a
interterritorial government post-independence was destroyed. Senghor went as far as to
call the law a “regression” for African political development. 26
Guinea, under the more radical leadership of Touré, was stronger in its
denouncement of the law. In Touré’s own words:
The loi cadre, by dividing the federations into separately administered territories,
by refusing even to consider a coordinating government among the territories,

Milcent, “Senegal,” 100.
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26
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sowed the seed in Africa of the breakup of the federations. And it was not by
chance that French West Africa was given eight autonomous governments instead
of a single one. It was part of a nefarious scheme to continue the metropolitan
control over underdeveloped but potentially rich territories. It was to perpetuate
colonialism in a less apparent but nonetheless efficient form, in the final analysis
to continue the exploitation of the men and riches of Africa, who were to be
rendered the more vulnerable by this “balkanization.”27
For Touré, the loi cadre resulted in more French control of the territories, the opposite of
the liberalizing narrative the French administration was using to promote the law. As
well, for the Guineans, the law provided proof that Africans were ready to handle their
own future. If they could be entrusted with these limited powers by the French
administration, then they were capable of handling enough power to decide the political
future of their territory.
Côte D’Ivoire was isolated in its strong support of the loi cadre. Houphouët, after
the rehabilitation of his relationship with the French administration, maintained this
strong relationship through to independence. In fact, Houphouët, after establishing
enough control over Ivoirian administration, was able to leave the PDCI in control while
he drafted the loi cadre with the French administration in Paris as a minister-delegate to
the presidency.28 His contribution to the law reflects his personal views on the future path
of political development in the colonies. In contrast to Senghor and his dreams of an
African federation, Houphouët envisioned a Franco-African Republic where each

27
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component country would have complete internal autonomy while a French led (and
Parisian-based) federal parliament and federal executive would maintain control of
monetary policy, defense, and foreign relations. His goal in this was to maintain some
semblance of French control and contribution to the territories while establishing
economic independence for Côte D’Ivoire. At the time, the colonial organization of the
territories was economically disadvantageous for Ivoirians, as the richer territory was
financially supporting its less prosperous neighbors. 29 Thus the “balkanization” of the
territories, which was inherently undesirable by other African territories, was an
extremely desirable choice for the Ivoirians. 30 With these strong divisions between the
two powerhouses within the RDA, Houphouët and Touré, RDA membership became
divided on the future of French-African relations. One camp followed Touré, who
supported a strong federal structure within Africa itself, with the power to establish
independence for the colonies and create new relationships with France on a confederal
basis. Meanwhile, Houphouët’s supporters favored a stronger federal relationship
between the metropole and the territories, where France would act as a member of the
group of states, on an equal basis as Africans. 31
As the Fourth Republic of France deteriorated, which was predominantly brought
on by the outbreak of a large-scale rebellion in colonial Algeria, the emergence of the
subsequent Fifth Republic led by General de Gaulle meant that the political relationship
of France to its territories was again to be reformed. With the introduction of the Fifth
Republic, the French government held a referendum within the colonies to decide
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whether or not they wanted to continue their relationship with France into this new epoch
for the administration. For the colonies, the proposed changes included joining the French
Community, a new organization for the French presence in their overseas territories.
Debate quickly broke out among the Africans on the unprecedented choice. Cote
D’Ivoire under Houphouët was supportive of the Franco-African Community. As with
the loi cadre, Houphouët had contributed to the process of drafting the new constitution
and the framework for the Community, thus the changes of the relationship between the
French to the territories included many aspects desired by Houphouët. 32 However, the
Ivoirian leader failed to understand the political tide in the wider African territories; his
strong hold and influence in Cote D’Ivoire had lulled him into a false sense of security. 33
Senghor and Lamine Guèye in Senegal were skeptical of the new changes, but
lacked the complete control over the territory to coordinate a “no” vote. The French were
able to use their control of the hugely influential Muslim marabouts to push support for
inclusion within the Community. This left Senghor to promote a lukewarm support of the
appeal, in which he masterfully utilized double-talk: “Yes to African unity, yes to
independence, yes to association with France!” 34 Senghor, unhappy with the threat of
retaliation by the French and the lack of discussion over future possibilities at
independence, was advocating for a “yes” vote with the understanding that the territory
would soon be making a stronger push for independence, with the hopes that the break
could be conciliatory.

32
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The Guineans under Touré resonated with the Senegalese desire to have a
concrete assurance of future options for independence, the difference was that the PDG
had enough power to influence the vote within the territory. Touré remained as opposed
to the Community as he was to the implementation of the loi cadre. He argued that the
Franco-African Community offered no genuine independence for its members, and in fact
reaffirmed many of the weaknesses in the loi cadre rather than attempting to improve the
weaknesses of the previous law. 35 Touré argued for a redrafting of the constitution to
include provisions that respect the right of Africans to “seek the right to free selfdetermination, to administer themselves directly, and to manage their own affairs.” For
Touré, the most important consideration for the future was the implementation of
increased sovereignty and enthusiastic consent by all interested parties in current and
future agreements.36 With these changes, Guinea would vote “yes.”
However, de Gaulle was using this referendum to reestablish French control over
the territory after years under the more lenient Mollet government. Member states had to
agree to association under French terms or face consequences. 37 His response to the
Guineans demands for modifications was stern, and intended for the wider African
audience who were on the fence about the Community as much as it was intended for
Touré:
France proposes this community; nobody is obliged to join it. You have talked of
independence. I say here even more loudly than I have elsewhere that
independence is up to Guinea…. There will, of course, be some consequences for
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Guinea, but there will be no obstacles in the way. Your country can do what it
wants the way it wants to and follow any course it likes. If Guinea says “yes”—
that is, if it freely, spontaneously, of its own accord accepts the constitution—and
if France on its side says “yes,” then the African territories and the Métropole can
work together for mutual profit. 38
The Guineans were willing to take the risk. With an overwhelming vote of “no” for the
referendum, they became the only colony to reject the Community and embarked as the
first French West African independent state established in 1958.
Although Guinea was the only territory to voluntarily leave the umbrella of
French colonization, the Community was not to destined to be a long-lasting, cohesive
institution. The massive affirmative vote in the referendum by the other territories was
not tantamount to acceptance of the ideology behind the French Community, nor was it a
consensus on Houphouët’s ideology present within the text. 39 Senghor quickly moved to
establish the foundations of his long-awaited African federation, recruiting leaders in
Soudan (modern-day Mali), Upper Volta (modern-day Burkina Faso), and Dahomey
(modern-day Benin) to work on creating a federational authority within the Community. 40
The French, apprehensive about attempts to consolidate power that competed with their
authority, subverted the cohesion of this proposed federation. Thus the Mali Federation
was born with only Soudan and Senegal after the efforts at sabotage by the French were
successful in poaching Dahomey and Upper Volta away from federation. 41 Still, with the
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creation of the Mali Federation, Senghor, with the combined leadership of Keita in
Soudan, felt comfortable moving the incorporated territories towards independence. Just
two years after the creation of the Community in 1960, the Federation made known its
intent to exercise its right to independence while maintaining its status as a member of
the Community, which was accepted by the French authorities. 42
Houphouët recognizing that his control over the Community was not as strong as
he had initially thought, quickly readjusted his policies within the Community. Beginning
with critiques of the Community not publicly expressed before—commenting on the
politicization of Community institutions, slowness and insufficiencies of French aid, and
the retention of French authorities in the territory—Houphouët began developing his plan
to strike out from the newly founded association. 43 His plan developed into the radical
decision to declare independence while leaving the Community altogether. Houphouët,
illustrating his mastery of political maneuvering, was able to leave the Community while
retaining his strong relationship with the French—including French sponsorship of Côte
D’Ivoire’s statehood at the UN, agreements for international aid, and the increase of
French subsidies and foreign investment in the newly declared state. 44 By the end of
1960, all of French West Africa had become independent, marking the beginning of
political development run by the Africans themselves.
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Chapter 3: Côte d’Ivoire

Political Development

As a newly emerging state, Côte d’Ivoire was the rising star of French West
Africa. Near the end of the colonial period, Houphouët had successfully transformed his
strong relationship with the metropole into massive economic benefits, leading the new
state into a promising future: “To the visitor, the Ivory Coast is plainly the ‘miracle state’
of Africa. From the glittering new office towers of Abidjan, to the neatly laid out
plantations and over-flowing markets of small upper-country towns, there is an air of
prosperity pervading the country and forming a startling contrast with the run-down
appearance of, say, Senegal or Ghana.” 45 This economic bliss period, with its
accompanying pacification of strong popular opinions, helped Houphouët quickly
solidify his power over the territory under the new Constitution. The image of Côte
d’Ivoire as an economic paradise included certain apathies of the public towards politics.
While other French West African nations were grappling with a particularly opinionated
and outspoken citizenry eager to impact its own administration in major ways for the first
time, Côte d’Ivoire was marked by the absence of political comment from the populace.46
Most observers argue that Houphouët was able to completely consolidate all
government responsibilities under himself by 1963. 47 The first constitution, which was
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crafted with the express desire for a strong and stable government, contained a few key
provisions for the establishment of political institutions in the country. The role of
president was given a five-year term and elected by universal suffrage. 48 The president
was not only the chief executive but also the head of state. And while he was responsible
to a national assembly, a vote to overthrow the president also entailed the dissolution of
the national assembly under that president, limiting the willingness of the assembly to
take action if it would hurt their positions as well. 49 Power under this system rapidly
came to rest in the hands of a small group of men, with the predominant share of power
in Houphouët’s own hands. 50
After this initial period of change, the state settled into a comfortable one-party
regime. Some have categorized the regime as benevolent authoritarianism—democracy à
l’Ivoirienne—where the president retained all of the power, but still remained attuned to
his constituents through various processes.51 These processes included his dialogues, a
series of mass meetings with different sections of Ivoirian society where he could meet
with locals and listen to their thoughts as he created policy decisions, and the more
traditional resources of persuasiveness, a firm grip on the party machinery, and the
wealth of the state. 52 The description of Jean-François Médard is particularly apt in
describing the regime of the economically advantaged Côte d’Ivoire:
We certainly do not pretend that Côte d’Ivoire is a pluralist, liberal democracy on
the Western model; moreover, it does not pretend to be that. The absence of
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judicially protected civil liberties, the state monopoly of the press, the absence of
institutionalized opposition and, until recently, of free elections, permits us to
speak of an authoritarian political regime. But that is true of the overwhelming
majority of political systems present and past. Yet, there are immense differences
among different authoritarian regimes…. The Ivoirian regimes achieves a strange
combination of authoritarianism and liberalism, of authority and benevolence, of
firmness and moderation: in short, it is a paternalistic regime. 53
With the combination of economic prosperity and stable, benevolent rule, many Ivoirians
had no need to question or seek to change the political situation in their country.
One of Houphouët’s biggest strengths was his ability to peacefully coopt and
absorb potential sources of opposition. His publicly expressed opinion towards the
establishment of an opposition party was that he was not opposed in principle, but it
needed to develop when it would be constructive, otherwise it was an unnecessary
luxury.54 Personal diplomacy, wealth, party organization, and the time-honored use of
political posts and prestige were Houphouët’s preferred method of subduing challengers;
only when these methods had failed would the PDCI move into harsher approaches
including jailing, expulsion, and forced retirement. Even after using force, it was a
temporary measure. Opponents who eventually repented would be given other offers of
collaboration and absorption into the party fold. 55
This strong emphasis on cooptation led to the PDCI have an extremely wide base
of support throughout the country as Houphouët and other party members worked to
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integrate the various ethnic groups and regions into the party’s ideology. The inclusion of
ethnic integration is key, as it later becomes one of the largest issues in Ivoirian politics,
yet under Houphouët’s reign it was kept under control through his integration and
cooptation methods. Article 7 of the constitution was founded during this time, which
prohibited political parties to organize themselves under ethnic, regional, or religious
affiliations. Additionally, any citizen born on the Ivoirian territory with one native
Ivoirian parent had the right to run for presidential office. Ethnic and regional conflicts
were subdued as Houphouët made sure that wealth was distributed equally throughout the
territory, implementing state development projects in areas that didn’t receive the
economic cushion of the cocoa producing regions.
As the economics of the state weakened towards the end of the 1970s, failings of
Houphouët’s political system began to surface. The political apathy of the Ivoirian
populace was heavily based on the economic stability of the state in two main ways. With
economic prosperity, many Ivoirians adopted a passive acceptance of the regime based
on the continuity of economic development. Additionally, the PDCI’s control over the
politics of the territory was based on a patronage system—with political appointments
and state goods as the product—and without the same levels of state resources the
patronage system was insufficient to pull in possible opposition. This method of
cooptation and absorption is sometimes termed “le compromis houphouétiste”: a system
created by Houphouët-Boigny where, in the absence of democratic channels of
expression, political demands and political conflicts were kept stable through the use of
the PDCI’s, and the Ivoirian state’s, economic strength to meet demands, develop
minority dominated regions, appease political enemies, and keep the public in a state of
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apathy.56 PDCI’s integration of the diverse elements of Ivoirian society had built little
sense of nationhood apart from their willingness to cooperation in order to take advantage
of financial growth.
With his control and influence waning as a result of the economic recession,
Houphouët was forced to readjust the political system. In 1980, the first liberalization of
the Ivoirian political system was approved, with the opening of National Assembly
elections to competition between nominees for the same position, though still within the
single PDCI party. While a multiparty system had yet to be installed, voters now had
choice in their representatives at the local and regional level. The result was stark; there
was an 82% turnover rate with a strong base of support for newer, young candidates over
old incumbents. Houphouët strategy had worked perfectly, he had given voters the
illusion of having voiced their opinions at the ballot, and now had a new cabinet of young
PDCI representatives who, rather than being a strong voice for the discontent of the
masses, owed Houphouët for their new positions. 57
A more concrete liberalization came with the 1991 elections, the first multiparty
elections in the state. Houphouët-Boigny controlled the transition to give the PDCI the
best advantage against the main opposition party, the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI)
headed by Laurent Gbagbo. Building upon his coalition-building capabilities fostered in
the years of single party rule, Houphouët-Boigny assembled various factions of the PDCI
into a strong coalition of the north, center, and southeast, as well as adopting an simplemajority electoral system that allowed foreigners to vote. This built a support base for the
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PDCI that was extremely broad and all-encompassing, while the opposition reactively
branded itself as a narrowly-focused ethnic party for the Bété people, which resulted in
an easy victory—86 percent—for Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI. 58
The opening of elections at this point was a smart move by Houphouët-Boigny, as
the economy worsened, and the patronage system weakened, a transition towards
democracy was necessary. The choice to open elections himself, rather than calling a
National conference and a reexamination of the constitution as advocated by Laurent
Gbagbo, allowed Houphouët-Boigny to control the liberalization to the advantage of the
PDCI and resulted in a strong PDCI in the multiparty political climate and an isolated and
divided opposition.59
However, there were naturally some difficulties in the first national multiparty
elections. As opposition parties were only newly allowed, the certification process of
national opposition parties was delayed in the lead-up to the election, meaning that the
time for new parties to campaign limited. As well, opposition parties faced difficulties
acquiring permits for headquarters, setting up the infrastructure for campaigning such as
telephones and printing presses, and establishing support bases to counter the power of
the long dominant PDCI. 60 The results of this liberalization was a further strengthened
PDCI, the creation of a parliamentary opposition, and a new government post of Prime
Minister, which Houphouët-Boigny awarded to Alassane Ouattara.61
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The next national elections held in 1995 presented an entirely different political
climate. With the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, and a resulting splintering of the
PDCI between supporters of one successor—Henri Konan Bédié, the president of the
National Assembly—and Alassane Ouattara—the former prime minister—the PDCI was
heavily weakened and the political climate took a darker turn. Bédié argued that the
constitution clearly outlined himself as the rightful heir to the presidency. This was
officially accurate; Article 11 of the constitution stated that in the event of a presidential
death, the president of the National Assembly assumes the role of president until
elections could be called. Ouattara advocated for the appointment of an interim president
and the immediate planning of new elections. Bédié ultimately won the struggle and
declared himself president. 62
As the next elections approached in 1994, Bédié as the new head of the PDCI
faced a much more difficult path to electoral domination when compared to HouphouëtBoigny’s relatively easy transition. Ouattara, and even Gbagbo and his FPI party,
provided much more threatening oppositional capabilities than in the previous years. 63
Bédié had also lost the support of the northern section of his coalition, which had allied
themselves with fellow northerner Ouattara. This tension with the northern coalition was
anticipated, even without the split between Bédié and Ouattara. Northerners were
beginning to be dissatisfied with the rewards for their loyalty and had begun demanding
more high-ranking positions and development programs, especially since northern
support heavily aided PDCI dominance in the multiparty system. 64
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Whereas Houphouët-Boigny had relied on his broad coalition to result in electoral
success, Bédié instead switched to a system of narrowing the political power of those
who would not support the PDCI. Bédié introduced the concept of Ivoirité, that is, the
idea that only those who had two Ivoirian parents could vote and run for election. This
move purposefully disenfranchised most northerners from the electoral process, as many
people who lived there, though they were born in Côte d’Ivoire, had parents who came
from Burkina Faso, Guinea, or Mali. The influx of immigrants in Côte d’Ivoire had
historically been encouraged under the Houphouët-Boigny regime, part of the reason that
he was so popular among that sector of the Ivoirian public, as a means of providing labor
for expanding markets throughout the country.
With a formal amendment to the electoral code in 1995, just before the elections,
Bédié successfully hindered much of the northern coalition from voting and even
excluded Ouattara from running for president under accusations that he had Burkinabe
lineage.65
This election began a tradition of using xenophobic beliefs and the manipulation
of nationality as a means of exerting control over the political process. Whereas
Houphouët-Boigny had emphasized coalition building through the distribution of state
resources to stifle ethnic or regional tensions—which as discussed above included tools
such as regional development projects and expanded voting rights—Bédié, who lacked
the economic means of subduing oppositional opinions, used ethnic tension and exclusion
as a means of guaranteeing his victory in the election. This shift, along with the continued
economic failures of the state and the instability of opening up elections, caused large
65
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public demonstrations over political issues to become increasingly common throughout
the 1990s. Especially after 1993, public demonstrations, barricades, meetings, and sit ins
were met with higher resistance from the state, including political assassinations, the use
of excessive force, and the use of ammunition against protesters. 66 This climate of
violence in the political domain was worsened significantly throughout the period, which
multiple analysts see as one of the original sources of the brutality of political change
within the country. 67
While this method of control was effective in the short term, as Bédié won the
election after both Gbagbo and Ouattara called for their political support bases to boycott
elections, his success in politics was soon ended by military coup. In 1999, growing
political tensions, as well as issues with the army, led to Côte d’Ivoire’s first military
coup. Headed by General Robert Gueï, the military leader declared that the purpose of the
coup was to clean up Ivoirian politics and organize new elections. 68 Gueï also initially
announced his plan to transfer power back to a civilian government, but soon decided to
run for the presidency himself.
In order to improve his opportunity to move from military to civilian leader of the
state, he further cemented the legalization of Ivoirité in Ivoirian politics by implementing
a new constitution that included Article 35, which again stated that a presidential
candidate must be Ivoirian by birth, must have parents who are both Ivoirian by birth, and
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must never have acquired another nationality. 69 The constitutional change was augmented
by a controversial Supreme Court decision, which disqualified fourteen of the nineteen
presidential candidates—including Ouattara on citizenship grounds and Bédié for not
submitting a proper medical certificate—essentially leaving the presidential race a contest
between Gbagbo and Gueï only. 70 While turnout was only 35 percent, due to election
boycotts from disenfranchised voters of both the PDCI and RDR parties, Gbagbo won
with around 60 percent of the vote. While Gueï attempted to disband the National
Electoral Commission and declare himself the winner, demonstrations from FPI
supporters and confrontation with the presidential guard forced Gueï to flee and allowed
Gbagbo to successfully declare himself president. 71
While Gbagbo initially showed signs of attempting a national reconciliation to
recover from the events of the previous years, chiefly through organizing provincial
elections and decentralizing state authority, his efforts were not effective after September
19, 2001, when a group of around eight hundred exiled soldiers called the Patriotic
Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) launched coordinated attacks on government and
military facilities in an attempted coup. 72 This coup attempt led to a prolonged civil war
between rebel forces in the north and the government forces in the south. As this section
examines political developments, and not security concerns, the discussion around the
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conflict in the upcoming paragraphs will center on the political demands of the rebels and
the developments of the conflict in the political domain.
The original intent of the rebel movement was exclusively the removal of Gbagbo
from presidential office; therefore the original MPCI group relied on a potential quick
military victory and did not have any plans for what would come after the unseating. 73
Once it became clear that the military standoff would become long and protracted,
negotiation, especially with international actors, became a chief tactic for the military
group as it attempted to prepare itself for a long, sustained stalemate. The first set of
demands from the MPCI were clear: the resignation of Gbagbo; new national elections
open for all Ivoirians; a review of the constitution, specifically related to citizenship,
candidate eligibility, and land-ownership; reintegration of rebel forces into the national
military; amnesty for the rebels; and an opening up of the political sphere to
northerners.74
International actors mediating the conflict recognized most of the political
demands by the rebels as valid, and thus stopped efforts by Gbagbo and the central
government to solve the conflict through force and annihilation, but the MPCI faced
heavy difficulty in moving forward their agenda when it came to the resignation of
Gbagbo from office. Thus French and West African negotiators gave the MPCI leverage
by justifying the rationalization of their political demands, and by protecting them from
Gbagbo’s potential military backlash, but stopped short of recognizing the MPCI as a
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legitimate political actor that could make political demands, as they were not a political
organization with a popular mandate. 75
Gbagbo and the central government repeatedly illustrated their reluctance to
acknowledge the rebels as anything but a military threat; even after the MPCI agreed to a
cease-fire and attempted to move into the negotiation of a peace deal, Gbagbo failed to
send representatives multiple times to sign the cease-fire agreement and encouraged
ECOWAS negotiators to leave the country all while continuing to attack rebel
strongholds, showing his preference for a military solution. 76
When peace talks were finally initiated, they were unproductive and inefficient.
Gbagbo, while agreeing to give the rebels amnesty and reintegrate rebel soldiers,
continued to send low-level delegates with no representative powers to the peace talks
and refused to consider new elections, which was supported by the ECOWAS mediators.
These first peace talks ended in failure, as the MPCI withdrew over fears of being
sidelined from any political considerations and preferred to continue the stalemate until
the playing field was changed. 77
By 2003, the peace talks had finally produced a peace accord agreed upon by both
sides. The Linas-Marcoussis Accord (LMA) was drafted in Paris, and included the
following compromises: the creation of a reconciliation government with full executive
powers, land reform, the drafting of an electoral timetable culminating in the upcoming
2005 elections, the revision of presidential eligibility, and the reform of nationality
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laws.78 While both sides gained necessary concessions, Gbagbo was left unsatisfied by
weakening of the presidency that would come from giving powers to the reconciliation
government and to the new Prime Minister, and the Forces Nouvelles, the evolved
grouping of rebel forces, remained suspicious that these changes would truly force
Gbagbo to lessen his hold on power. 79 While the peace accord had been signed, both
parties continued to block any successful implementation of the deal itself. Specifically
for Gbagbo, who, after appointing a new Prime Minister, refused to allow the Forces
Nouvelles to allocate people to any of the reconciliation posts, halting progress on
movements past the stalemate that had existed since the initial coup attempt.
An updated version of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement was drafted in early
2005, reflecting the urgency of development on the peace process as Gbagbo’s
presidential term came to its end. The Pretoria Accords, like Linas-Marcoussis, attempted
to touch on all of the issues surrounding the conflict, including the demobilization and
disarmament of militias, the reinforcement of the Independent Electoral Commission, the
participation of the United Nations in the electoral process, and by pushing a new session
of the National Assembly to amend legislation on nationality and identification laws. 80
Yet the continued mistrust of both sides of the reliability of the other, as well as the
continued preference for potential military action over a negotiated agreement, meant that
the successful implementation of the Pretoria Accords was also delayed indefinitely.
With the end of Gbagbo’s presidential mandate in October 2005, the United Nations
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extended the mandate for another twelve months and called for movement forward on the
implementation of the accords.
While the extended mandate only pushed back the expected elections for one
year, it wasn’t until two years later that a movement forward in the peace process was
achieved. As both sides faced the reality that the now four-year stalemate was not
advancing their interests by any means, as well as the growing regional and international
fatigue and heightened risks of popular revolt as the conflict was further left unsolved, a
new peace agreement was drafted. President Gbagbo announced in late 2006 his draft of
a “made in Côte d’Ivoire” plan and an intention to hold direct dialogue with the rebels to
negotiate an end to the stalemate and the reunification of the country, which would be
facilitated by Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso and ECOWAS. The Ouagadougou Peace
Accord, named after the location of its signing, contained many of the previous deals
from past accords, but also established more concrete steps for the implementation of the
agreement. It outlined three steps towards resolving the conflict: the issuance of birth
certificates to those who were born in the country but had never been officially declared
in the registries and a national campaign of identification to issue identity and voter cards
to the eligible population; a restructuring of the Ivoirian defense and security forces; and
the removal of the “zone of confidence” and the French and UN forces monitoring it to
encourage the reunification of the country. 81 With the Ouagadougou Accord, the
government received the promise of the return of governmental administration to the
north, including financial administration and taxation, which would undermine the ability
of the Forces Nouvelles to finance any future elongation of the stalemate. As well, the
81

Ibid., 21.

33

Forces Nouvelles were granted the right to fill the role of Prime Minister, which ensured
that they could have more power in the political process as the conflict came to an end.

Security Crises

This section will begin by analyzing some of the issues of military development
that helped push the initial coup attempt and turned the conflict into the stagnated civil
war it became. Second, it will analyze how security developments either pushed each side
to the negotiating table or maintained the conflict even longer.
The initial coup attempt clearly illustrated the weakness of the governmental
forces, (FANCI) and the strength of the rebel group (MPCI) in the beginning period of
the war. Partially due to the element of surprise, the rebels were able to take control of
multiple important territories within the north in their opening strike without much
resistance from the Ivoirian military. Ivoirian armed forces appeared unwilling to
challenge the rebel’s coordinated attacks, and in certain cases FANCI forces, especially
soldiers who were northerners themselves, defected to the rebels. In the weeks following
the failed coup, recruitment for the MPCI rapidly increased their numbers to an even
stronger base. The subsequent period of recruitment increased the MPCI forces to over
five thousand, while FANCI forces, which had numbered at five thousand before the
rebellion and the ensuing loss of soldiers, diminished in size. 82 This loss of soldiers
augmented already existing weaknesses of the FANCI defense line; the government
forces were poorly equipped, had insufficient arms, were not properly trained, and lacked
82
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much motivation to fight against the rebels. These weaknesses were intentional. Gbagbo
had hesitated to fully invest government resources into the state militia over concerns
about his ability to control them, and had rather invested in the gendarmes, who he
trusted more.83
The MPCI, on the other hand, was well prepared for its strike, especially since its
original intent was to take down Abidjan in order to control the entirety of the state’s
territory. The main sources of military equipment and soldiers for the MPCI as it
organized the coup attempt were the Ivoirian military itself and Burkina Faso. 84 Military
exiles from the north had been building up for years, beginning in the years of General
Gueï’s coup, there had been a systematic purging of the Ivoirian military by targeting
northerners. This was in coordination with the political disenfranchisement also
happening in the Gueï years. Two generals who were dismissed in this purge—General
Palenfo and General Coulibaly—would become important actors in the insurgency
movement.85
Gbagbo had continued this exclusion of northerners who had been a part of the
military in his regime as well; those who were thought to be sympathetic to Gueï or
Ouattara after the election results were either removed or demoted to make room for
Gbagbo’s political base. 86 Seven to eight hundred soldiers, many of whom were
scheduled for demobilization by Gbagbo or had faced harassment due to their
traditionally northern names, participated in the rebellion for the rebels. 87
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These dismissed soldiers constituted a large part of the MPCI’s original
membership. Their status as ex-Ivoirian military meant that much of the arms and
ammunition in the early days of the rebellion came from defectors who brought
equipment with them, or through planned seizures of Ivoirian resources, armed robberies
of military depots, and the seizure of military equipment when the coup attempt took
place and territory was seized. After the opening attack, FANCI had an estimated 40
percent loss of its arms stocks to the rebels. 88
Burkina Faso also provided a strong source of support to the rebels. Exiled
soldiers from the Ivoirian military used Burkina Faso as a safe haven before their
attempted coup with support from the Burkinabè president, Blaise Compaoré. Compaoré
also gave the growing rebel faction arms and training, contributing to their stockpile in
preparation for the first attack. Compaoré did not attempt to hide his involvement in
hosting the aspiring insurgency; he had repeatedly warned Gbagbo of the danger of not
addressing the growing threat or solving the issues causing military exiles to be in
Burkina Faso in the first place. He even offered to return soldiers, some of whom had
been tried and convicted in absentia, but only if Gbagbo agreed to give them amnesty and
reinstate them in the military. After Gbagbo’s refusal, Compaoré continued his support of
the rebels as they grew into the MPCI. 89
In the early morning of 19 September 2002, the rebels began their mutiny in a
series of well-coordinated attacks on military installations in the economic capital,
Abidjan, as well as bigger northern towns, Bouaké and Korhogo. While successful in
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taking control of these northern hubs, they were unsuccessful in taking Abidjan, and
retreated to Bouaké, which would become the headquarters of the MPCI, later to become
the Forces Nouvelles.90 By the end of September, the rebels had a solid hold on all of the
northern territory. The rebels were unable to take Abidjan not because of the strength of
government forces, but rather due to the significant presence of French forces in the city,
which protected both Abidjan and Yamoussoukro, the economic and political capitals of
the state.91
While the rebels were advantageous in the beginning stages of the conflict at
taking northern territory and engaging with governmental forces, as the conflict began to
move into a longer lasting stalemate the benefit given to the rebels begun to fade. The
MPCI’s original arrangement was created to provide the best chances at taking territory
quickly and effectively, which is strategically beneficial for a short-lived coup, but as the
conflict evolved into a full-fledged rebel movement in a drawn-out standoff, their
resources, organization, and military strength weakened. This, along with the central
government’s need to reorganize and replenish after their losses, led to a mutual ceasefire agreement in mid-October 2002. The cease-fire effectively split the country in half,
with French, and eventually United Nations, forces patrolling a central “zone of
confidence,” separating Gbagbo forces in the South from rebel forces in the North. 92
While both sides agreed to the cease-fire, and showed hesitant interest in
negotiating a peace agreement, it was clear that the two preferred to wait for a military
solution rather than move forward realistically on a diplomatic one. As discussed in the
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previous section, throughout the stalemate there were many peace agreements
negotiated—Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (2003), Kléber Accords (2003), Accra I
(2002), Accra II (2003), Accra III (2004), Pretoria I (2005), and Pretoria II (2005)—yet
all of the accords listed were not successful in bringing an end to the impasse.93
Conditions on the ground did not incentivize political settlements for either side. The
“zone of confidence,” patrolled by international forces, lowered the risk of attack and the
cease-fire offered a respite from large-scale battle. Given that the core demands from
both sides were incompatible at this point, neither the government nor the rebels saw a
need to focus on the peace talks and rather continued to restructure and strengthen their
military capabilities as it appeared that the only through conflict would either side
achieve fully what it wanted.
While the stalemate persisted through to 2010, there were a variety of situations
that happened during this time that rapidly changed the equilibrium. One such event was
the emergence of two new rebel groups in western Côte d’Ivoire towards the end of 2002.
The Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) and the Popular Movement of the Ivoirian
Great West (MPIGO), appeared similar to the MPCI in intent; both groups claimed the
dual goals of avenging the former Ivoirian president and General Robert Gueï by
deposing President Gbagbo.
While originally focused on stressing their differences from the MPCI, by early
2003 they had completely matched their political demands to that of the MPCI as well. 94
There were some important distinctions for these two rebel groups, however. Most
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important were their ties to Liberia and President Taylor. While the MJP was able to
retain most of its Ivoirian character, it was initially backed by the Liberian president. Its
overall role was insignificant as it was absorbed into the MPCI by mid 2003. 95 The
MPIGO was more overtly Liberian in character. Most of its forces were Liberian soldiers
promised free reign of any loot, and the rebel group was openly supported by Taylor as
an attempt to punish Gbagbo for his own assistance to Liberian rebels. Taylor’s support
also reflected his wish to help establish a new president that would be friendlier to his
regime. As well, if the western rebellion were successful, Taylor would be able to divert
international attention from his own conflicts in Liberia, provide his fighters he could not
support with loot as a means of payment, and provide a buffer zone to prevent both the
MPCI and the Ivoirian government forces from getting too close to his border.96 Much
like the MPJ, the MPIGO was proven ineffectual at keeping territory and was absorbed
by the MPCI by the end of 2003.
While ineffectual at lasting in the conflict long-term, the two new rebel groups
complicated the situation. The Ivoirian government had to face three fronts, rather than
just one, and had illustrated its preference to negotiate with MPCI forces rather than the
pro-Liberian western rebels. 97 Perhaps the most important consequence of the
introduction of the new groups was the result of their absorption by the MPCI. After the
folding in of new elements, the MPCI renamed itself Forces Nouvelles, and was forced to
restructure its organization as well. The difficulties of introducing the MPJ and the
MPIGO caused the Forces Nouvelles to establish an administrative system, create a more
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united front against government forces, and implement La Centrale—a centralized
financial and taxation system for the northern region. 98 La Centrale developed into a quite
stable and lucrative income-generating mechanism for the Forces Nouvelles, which
allowed them to strengthen their position in the stalemate as they had a ensured ability to
continue financing their presence in the conflict, something sorely lacking after their
initial coup attempt.
With the arrival of the Ouagadougou Peace Accords, the inefficiencies of
previous peace negotiations were finally overcome and the stalemate was broken. While
the political concerns addressed in the Ouagadougou Peace Accords are already
discussed above, one of the most important changes militarily in this negotiation from
previous ones is the dismantling of the zone of confidence. The agreement stipulated the
use of joint brigades from both sides to replace the UN and French Security forces, and
the replacement of the zone with a “green line” dotted with observation points. 99 Given
that the zone of confidence had previously been utilized more as an assurance to both
sides that they were protected in the short-term from the other, the actual undoing of the
blockade encouraged both sides that peace was forthcoming, as they were now both at a
higher risk of attack as the defensive barrier was taken down; it was a purposeful
illustration of both side’s willingness to become more vulnerable as a sign of good faith.
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Analysis

The Ivoirian conflict presents many potential aspects of the relationship between
politics and security crises to explore. Within this analysis I will focus on three specific
aspects of the conflict which illustrate an intriguing link between the two concepts. The
first will be the Bédié’s use of Ivoirité, followed by Gueï and Gbagbo, to exclude the
north from the political process in order to strengthen their potential holds on power, and
how this political exclusion was mirrored by exclusion in the military forces. The second
aspect will be the stalemate of the conflict, and how the reaction of the international
community to the political demands of the rebels, and the natural incongruency of these
political demands with Gbagbo’s presidency, affected the peace process. The last link to
be discussed will be the use of the elections of 2010, and the necessary acceptance of
both sides of the results of these elections, as a means of finalizing the end of the conflict.
One of Houphouët-Boigny’s biggest strengths throughout his presidency was his
use of a patronage system to maintain both a solid hold on all levers of power and ensure
the continued peace and stability of the nation’s population in order to implement his
most valued goal for the Ivoirian state—economic growth. However, with the economic
recessions of the later years of his presidency, his ability to use a patronage system to
guarantee both his hold on power and the stability of the populace wavered. While he was
able to successfully maneuver the system to continue the dominance of the PDCI up until
his death, his successor, Bédié, was not as apt at the political game as his mentor.
Bédié was the first to resort to political exclusion to strengthen his position. The
exclusion of those who had parents born outside Côte d’Ivoire from any electoral process,
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including voting and running for election, was a targeted attack on the political
expression of the northern half of the country. Many northerners were children of
immigrants from other countries, predominantly Burkina Faso, Guinea, or Mali, who
Houphouët-Boigny had supported in coming to Cote d’Ivoire as a provision of cheap
labor to help expand the economy.100 With their exclusion, Bédié had a much easier time
winning the election, as his biggest opposition, Ouattara, and Ouattara’s main political
base were excluded from the vote. While both methods of controlling power were
undemocratic attempts to strengthen their personal hold on the levers of power, under
Houphouët’s system his manipulations strengthened the appearance of internal stability
while Bédié’s relied on increasing internal instability.
Gueï only further codified this exclusion by adding it to the constitution, and
Gbagbo was willing to use it to his advantage in the election of 2000. Every potential
presidential candidate, except Ouattara as a northerner himself, was willing to invoke
Ivoirité if it meant the presidential seat. While Gbagbo originally opposed the change and
boycotted elections in 1995, he refused to change the system of Ivoirité when it gave him
an advantage in the presidential race of 2000. Similarly, while Bédié was the first to
introduce Ivoirité into Ivoirian politics in 1994, in the post-coup elections it was himself,
along with Ouattara, who boycotted the election in response to Gueï’s
constitutionalization of the concept.
What is intriguing about the political exclusion was the correlation with military
exclusion. Throughout the Bédié years, military personnel were discriminated against if
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they had stereotypically northern names. This makes logical sense for Bédié and his
party; the military is one of the biggest threats to the central regime, and if that military is
staffed with people you are excluding from the political process, the risk of those
personnel in wanting to overthrow the government only increases. In order to react to the
potential danger of disgruntled military members, it is logical to take away their ability to
access the country’s weapons and sources of military power. Gueï continued this military
exclusion as well, purging the army of northerners after his coup, including the exile of
military leaders who were to become MPCI leaders after they fled to Burkina Faso.
Gbagbo, after gaining power, also continued this process. Seven to eight hundred of the
soldiers in the initial MPCI uprising were soldiers who had been scheduled for
demobilization by Gbagbo, and the new president had also taken resources from Ivoirian
military forces, which he did not fully trust, and place them in his local gendarmerie and
presidential guard.
While the logic is clear for the military exclusion of those the government was
repressing, the very exclusion itself helped to develop the rebel movement into the force
that was able to take and occupy the northern half of the country for eight years. As we
have already discussed, the first years of the MPCI’s existence was supported by
dismissed service members and the weapons that they had gained during their time in the
FANCI forces. Their dismissal from the army, an attempt to decrease their threat to the
central government, only gave them more motivation to become the MPCI itself.
Another aspect of the security/politics links within the Côte d’Ivoire case study to
be analyzed is the treatment of the political demands of the rebels, especially in the
opening stages of the conflict. The MPCI’s core demands included Gbagbo’s resignation,
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new national elections open to all Ivoirians, a review of the constitution, the reintegration
of rebel forces into the national military, amnesty for the rebels, and the opening up of the
political sphere to northerners.101 These demands address the two major concerns of the
rebel forces: their political and military exclusion. Successful reintegration in these two
domains was their chief goal. Yet, international actors who were mediating the conflict
refused to give the MPCI recognition as a political entity that could make political
demands; as a military group only military demands could be made. International actors
also inhibited the MPCI from asking for any political changes in the initial negotiations,
which delayed any possibility of the peace process to create an effective peace accord, as
the core of the conflict was the incongruency of the political demands of either side, not
the military issues which were a reaction to the political exclusion. Attempts by the
MPCI to create a political network in Europe, Mali, and Burkina also failed.
Furthermore, while the international community was objecting to the ability of the
MPCI to make political demands, they did recognize the legitimacy of the demands
themselves, which hindered Gbagbo’s ability to react to the rebels. Gbagbo was not
allowed to use military force to end the rebellion even after he recuperated from the
damage of the initial attacks. With the inability of the MPCI to change the conflict
through neither attacks nor political demands, and the inability of the presidential forces
to use violence and Gbagbo’s refusal to accept any political demands from the MPCI, the
conflict naturally settled into the long stalemate that it became.
The last aspect of the security-political relationship in the Côte d’Ivoire case to be
discussed is the use of the elections of 2010 as a means of finalizing the end of the
101
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conflict. With over six negotiated peace agreements signed throughout the conflict, the
arrival of the Ouagadougou Accord, and its four supplemental agreements, were not
guarantors of a finite ending to the conflict. Two aspects of the agreement made it strong
enough to survive the implementation period. The first has been discussed in the security
section: the dismantling of the zone of confidence. With the continuation of the zone,
both sides were supporting the potential of future conflict, necessitating the maintenance
of the buffer between the zones to protect from possible attacks. With its dismantling,
along with the concrete developments in the reintegration of the rebels within the armed
forces, allowed for the security aspect of the conflict to make meaningful development of
de-escalation.
The second factor within this de-escalation is a significant progression on the
political stalemate between the two entities, which was one of the biggest factors
inhibiting the implementation of peace. The Forces Nouvelles needed an assurance that
the political processes within the country would develop into a lasting system that would
not again move towards exclusion for northern voters. As well, given the illegitimacy of
the elections that had placed Gbagbo in power, the rebels required an legitimate election
in order to restore a sense of validity to the central government and the presidential
office. Gbagbo main interest was his hold on power, and while the Ouagadougou Accord
put him at risk of losing the presidency, he was confident in his ability to win another
election, or at least manipulate the climate into an election that he could win. With the
arrival of elections in 2010, the peace process was thrown into uncertainty; if either side
refused to accept the outcome, then any lasting movement towards peace would not be
made. Gbagbo’s failure to delay the elections of 2010, along with his failure to rig them
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for his victory, was the necessary catalyst to end the conflict. 102 Even as Gbagbo refused
to step down after the legitimate elections took place and Ouattara was declared the
winner, his position gave the international community, the rebels, and the police forces
the unity they needed to work together to arrest the former president and place Ouattara
as a leader that both the central government and the rebel forces could unite behind.
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Chapter 4: Guinea

Political Development

As Guinea became a new state, it faced many challenges due to its antagonistic
break with France. While de Gaulle had confirmed that any country who voted against
the Fifth Republic was free to opt out, the slighted French government and French
administrators engaged in punitive actions as a result of the “no” vote. French
administrators and technicians were given a period of ten months to transition out of the
country, with instructions to train their Guinean replacements, yet the majority of the
administration left as quickly as they could, even going so far as to destroy telephone
instruments and plumbing facilities, and destroying or taking vital files and paperwork
with them as they left. 103 Fortunately, due to its strength during the colonial period, the
PDG was a well-organized and disciplined party whose members were capable of taking
over a good number of the important functions of government—including tax collection
and maintenance of order. 104
Another key advantage for the blossoming Touré regime was the strong internal
political unity achieved during independence. In order to vote “no” in the referendum, the
party had been obligated to ensure that the public voted nearly unanimously against the
French. With independence achieved, the public was ready to work in unity to start
building up the new country as had been promised in the lead-up to the referendum
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vote.105 Through his own popularity within the country, and due to the short period of
harmony gifted as part of the referendum vote, Touré was able to establish a regime that
wasn’t simply a government with a single party, it was a political system where the
political party was the government. Touré himself described the role of the PDG as the
only necessary political institution in the government: “The PDG has not hesitated to say
that more than ever it will retain its supremacy over all other institutions in the country.
Only through the party can we… raise ourselves to the level of great responsibilities.”
Touré went even further by declaring “The party, then, is the supreme organ, occupying a
role that is higher than the government itself. Within its hands are concentrated political,
technical, economic, and judicial powers…. The Guinean regime is not a single-party
system; the regime is itself the party and no distinction can be made between the two.” 106
At this point in the state’s political structure, all other organs of government are
subordinate to the PDG. The tasks of the cabinet and the legislature are to apply the
decisions of the party, the only power they have is to figure out the details and execution
of policy already created through the party congress.107
While the country had adopted a Western-style constitution shortly after
independence, which implemented a system of checks and balances including the sharing
of power between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, Touré quickly
implemented the norm of party superiority over the branches of government and ultimate
supremacy of the PDG over all aspects of political and civic life. 108 According to him, the
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separation of powers “has no other result than to dispossess the people of its prerogatives
by making superior to its interests, either those of the state, of the army, of justice or, in
parliamentary democracy, of the parliament.” 109 Even political influences that were
outside of direct government control–such as youth, worker’s and women’s
organizations—were placed under control of the PDG, with a single party-supported and
controlled body for each organization type, and even mandatory participation in certain
instances, such as the PDG youth organization. 110 The Touré regime implemented many
rule changes that increased its control over civic life and civil society. These changes
included the abolition of private schools, subordination of religious leaders to the partystate, elimination of independent press, party control of all cultural and sports activities,
socialization of the economy, establishment of state farms and cooperatives, elimination
of liberal professions, and the monopolization of all intellectual life by PDG ideology. 111
Touré had various descriptions of his regime type. While not reluctant to use the
term “dictatorship,” he differentiated between democratic and undemocratic
dictatorships. In his view, the PDG, while having complete control over the political,
economic, and technical development of the state, represented the will of the people.
According to Touré’s definition, as long as PDG leadership truly embodies the wills of
the people, all of the leadership’s decisions are democratic. Touré argued that the
fundamental principle upon which the party is organized is democratic centralism: “from
top to bottom and bottom to top all decisions of whatever nature take into account the
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will of the majority of members.”112 This idea of democratic centralism also entails the
election of leadership at all levels of party organization, mandated reports by all party
organs to the electors, and the obligatory acceptance of all decisions of higher party
organs lower in the hierarchy. While the party created methods of solving intraparty
disagreements or criticisms and established dialogues between the lower echelons and
elite members of the party, resolutions laid down by the party leadership must be
executed fully, even if lower members did not approve. 113
With complete control over all political life, the PDG established four main
objectives: to maintain Sékou Touré in power; to establish control of the PDG under
Touré’s direction over all facets of Guinean life; to enable the Guineans to determine
their own pattern of economic and cultural expression; and to develop the economy. 114
Touré had a Fanon-esque vision for Guinean society, with a complete psychological
reconversion of the people that completely removed all of the colonial economic
structures designed to benefit only the Europeans. For Touré, this vision could only be
achieved with national unity and the full support of the masses, which led him to continue
to consolidate power. Only the total mobilization of the energies of the people under the
direction and guidance of the party could lead to his ideal liberalization of society. 115
The realization of the goals of Touré’s regime and the PDG quickly fell short of
anticipations. With control entirely in the hands of the PDG, meaning that control was
entirely in the hands of Touré himself, the capacity of a small number of people in
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obstructing the nation’s political, economic, and social development became clear.
National unity was hindered by the compulsory nature of party membership and the
party-controlled aspects of daily life. As well, the attempts of equality and fairness within
the party structures were undermined by the development of a party elite, which had a
much higher standard of living and social status than regular citizens. 116 This elite,
representing the party leadership, was corrupted by the promotion of political appointees
based on Touré’s impression of a candidate’s political fervor and opportunism, rather
than qualifications and skill. 117 Furthermore, the original “democratic centralism” aspects
of the PDG rule diminished over time, with the internal debates and discussions over
policy issues found within the early 1960s falling out of practice as power became
increasingly concentrated in the hands of Touré. 118
As the country entered into the late 1960s, the Touré regime became increasingly
suspicious and repressive. Various real and alleged plots to overthrow the regime towards
the end of the 1960s, and an unsuccessful invasion from Portuguese Guinea in 1970 led
Touré, who had now centralized power almost entirely in his hands, to become
increasingly paranoid, and heightened his need to have complete control over the
population.119 Power was further centralized under Touré and his most trusted associates,
which led to more corruption as family members and other associates took advantage of
the shift of the power of PDG from mass party to a small circle of political elites. 120 The
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dictatorship became increasingly brutal, with some sources estimating that tens of
thousands of Guineans were victims of political violence, thousands were jailed for
oppositional beliefs, and over one million citizens fled the country, becoming exiles. 121
The repression and brutality of the Touré regime in the later years was only ended with
his death in 1984 at the age of 62. 122
With the instability that came with the death of Touré, military forces were able to
successfully stage a coup and take power away from the PDG. Less than a month after
Touré’s death, a radio statement declared that the Guinean armed forces had taken power,
suspended the constitution, and had dissolved both the PDG and the National
Assembly.123 The coup was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Lansana Conté, who became
the head of state and chairman of the Military Committee for National Redress (CMRN),
which became the new governing entity. The CMRN, who framed the takeover as a
means of resolving the brutality and injustice of the Touré regime, which they cited as
“brutal and callously inhuman,” 124 declared that they would move towards democratic
reform, and argued that the undemocratic coup would soon transition to a civilian
regime.125 The new regime was successful in eliminating many of the worst abuses of the
Touré regime—freeing political prisoners, closing down the infamous Boiro
concentration camp, restoring civil liberties—and liberalizing the economy in its initial
years.126
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However, Conté soon argued against an early return to civilian rule, asserting that
a deliberate approach to reforms would be more beneficial to the country. 127 Between
1984 and 1990, the CMRN remained the sole governing institution, during which there
were no national or municipal elections, no political parties, no constitution, and no
separated governing bodies. The CMRN, with Conté as its leader, consolidated power
over the government and the military. 128
In 1990, a federal constitution was finally created. The new constitution
established a strong executive branch, allocating presidential powers that included
determining and managing national policy, ensuring the execution of the law, naming
ministers and all civilian employees, leading the military, and extensive pardoning
power.129 Furthermore, the constitution stipulated that the president would lead the
provisional legislative body until an election for the National Assembly was held,
elections which were delayed by Conté who could use his delegated powers to postpone
elections during a transitional period. 130 The first national elections were held in 1993 for
the presidency, which Conté was easily able to win amidst wide criticisms of possible
fraud.131 The 1993 election served as a means for which Conté could finally assert his
legitimacy as a democratically elected national leader, rather than a leader resulting from
the coup of 1984. He was again elected in 1998 and 2003, with his margin of victory
increasing with each election.
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Even while he continued to use undemocratic means to ensure his uncontested
hold on power, there were democratic evolutions within the years of Conté’s regime. The
1990 constitution established provisions protecting the civil liberties and political rights
of Guinean citizens, protected freedom of speech, religion, property rights, and religion,
and prohibited discrimination based on race, gender, or religion. As well, the constitution
provided safeguards against abuses of state forces and military on citizens. 132 Throughout
the Conté years, Guinean civil society began to develop with the emergence of political
parties, human rights associations, a free and independent press, and the proliferation of
NGOs.133 The free press in particular flourished in this time, as well as free speech for the
opposition to speak out against the ruling administration, though this was lessened in the
later years of the regime as Conté began to jail strong opponents and parties. 134 135
The end of the Conté regime came with his death in December of 2008. With the
death of Conté, Guinea went through a similar process as with Touré’s death, with
military captain Moussa Dadis Camara announcing hours after the dictator’s death that he
had seized control of the capital through military coup. Left, again, with the uncertainty
of succession, a military coup was a means of maintaining stability as Camara attempted
to fill the power vacuum left behind with the death of President Conté. Ambitious and
charismatic, he initially promised public reform and free and fair elections within two
years as a means of building legitimacy. Camara also promised that he nor any member
of his military coup would run for office.136 Tensions were heightened as the possibility
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of Camara running became stronger in the preparatory period for the transition into
civilian government. Responding to the tension, Camara asserted that “Any political
leader who makes trouble by organizing strikes of protests or any other forms of mass
mobilization will simply be removed from the list of candidates and will also be
prosecuted.”137 The public continued to resist, forming a 50,000-person rally to speak out
against the possibility of Camara running for office. The event turned deadly as forces
from the Presidential Guard fired directly into the stadium crown, and hunted down those
who ran into the streets.
The brutality of the attack ended Camara’s political aspirations, as he was shot by
an associate next month. By February 2010, the military junta formerly led by Camara
announced its decision to hand over power to a provisional government, which would
hold elections later in the year. General Konaté, who took over Camara’s role as head of
the military leadership, also declared the appointment of Jean-Marie Doré, an opposition
leader, as prime minister of the provincial government, significantly decreasing the
power of the military in establishing the new governmental system. 138 Elections were
held later in the year, and Guinea’s next president became Alpha Condé.
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Security Crises

As discussed in the previous section, Touré’s initial philosophy towards
governance was his self-titled “democratic” dictatorship, where the party had complete
control over all aspects of government and civil life, but worked to implement the will of
the people. For Touré’s initial goals for Guinean society—a deconstruction of colonial
institutions and restructuring of a new, completely independent and fulfilling social
structure—absolute control was a necessity. However, for a variety of reasons, once
complete centralization was achieved, Touré would quickly ignore the revolutionary
foundations of his independence movement in order to instead foster a brutal,
undemocratic dictatorship that would inflict much harm on Guinean society. Touré’s
regime itself became the main security threat to Guinean citizens in the initial decades of
the country’s existence.
His shift from charismatic independence leader to oppressive ruler is complex,
but many authors believe that his brutality correlated with his paranoia of losing power.
A series of events that came after the initial years of post-independence control proved to
Touré that his regime was not invincible. A 1970 invasion by Guinean exiles, with
support from the Portuguese navy and neighboring Guinea-Bissau, though unsuccessful,
pushed the president’s paranoia into a new domain. After the invasion, there were mass
arrests and public hangings for those who Touré viewed as potential opponents, even
those within the PDG. The paranoia became worse as the years progressed, especially
after other leaders within the independence and nationalist movements in the region were
toppled, such as through the coups overthrowing Nkrumah and Keïta in Ghana and Mali.
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As his hold on power became more tenuous, Touré’s obsession with using any
means to remain in power only worsened. 139 The increasing hostility and vindictiveness
of the Touré regime led to a mass migration of Guinean citizens to neighboring countries.
Between 1 and 2 million Guineans fled from the country during this period. His paranoia
also led him to shut down any potential sources of challenge to his hold on power. He
readily arrested or killed alleged enemies, jailing tens of thousands of citizens in the
infamous Boiro Camp prison, where many did not survive. 140 By 1977, only a small
number of Touré’s close political associates remained. Out of the 71 initial ministers and
secretaries of state that he had appointed, nine had been shot or hanged, eight had died
while in detention, eighteen were serving a life sentence for hard labor, twenty-one had
served prison terms but had been freed, five had escaped abroad, and only eleven avoided
any kind of punishment. 141
With Touré’s increased spiral into paranoia, the political development of the
country further stagnated. The regime demanded total loyalty, encouraged spying,
denounced anti-revolutionary or contradictory opinions, and was naturally suspicious of
university graduates and intellectuals who had studied abroad. 142 Fear of retribution
stifled any potential for oppositional opinions, free press, civil society, or any kind of
contribution to the governance process by those who were not Touré or Touré’s closest
and most trusted associates. Touré also lost any hope for his initial dreams of a new
future for Guinean society, as the climate of the country towards the end of his regime
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was that of “sullen indifference” for his revolution; apathy increased as citizens lived in
fear, watching the disappearance of many, the growth of corruption, and the loss of any
kind of mass support that was necessary for the changes Touré had initially promised. 143
With the death of Sékou Touré in 1984, the future of the country became quite
unstable, becoming a security crisis. Warnings were delivered about the potentiality of
ethnic violence among the three main ethnic groups, as well as the risk inherent in the
uncertainty of who was going to assume power and what the change would mean for the
future of Guinean politics. 144 Soon after Touré’s death, the uncertainty was resolved as a
bloodless military coup took place. The unresolved issue of succession gave the military
the opportunity to enact a significant regime change on the grounds of seeking to avoid
civil war.145 Guinea’s armed forces announced by radio their ascension to power,
declaring the suspension of the constitution, the country’s political party, and the
National Assembly. 146 The coup was enthusiastically accepted by the Guinean people.
The first challenge of the Conté regime was transitioning from military rule to a
democratically elected government. Yet, the first elections were not held until 1990, six
years after the death of Touré, and elections for the presidency were further delayed until
1993, where Conté became a democratically elected leader and president of the nation.
Conté’s regime was marked by an interesting relationship between the military
and the central government. In the beginning years of the regime, the military was seen as
a beneficial presence in society, as it was the force that had liberated people from the

143

Cartwright, Political Leadership in Africa, 208.
U.S. Agency for International Development, Guinea: Potential Sources of Conflict and Instability. PNACN-619 (Washington, DC, 1998), 6, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacn619.pdf
145
U.S. Agency for International Development, Democratic Governance in Guinea, 23.
146
Yansané, “Guinea: the significance of the coup of April 1984,” 1231.
144

58

oppressive Touré regime. And the military, supervised by Conté, took steps to liberalize
the country in response. Political prisoners were freed, the Boiro concentration camp was
closed down, and basic civil liberties were restored. 147 A USAID report succinctly
summarizes the view of the military by the public at this stage:
First, the military carried out the coup that brought down the old regime. Second,
the military claims that it was the force which brought democracy to Guinea.
Third, it claims to be the guarantor of political stability and national unity. Fourth,
the military receives many national honors. A special day was set aside to
celebrate the 36th anniversary of the army. President Conté owes his position as
national leader to the military which chose him to lead the country after the coup
and which agreed to gradually power to a civilian regime. As an interest group,
the military has traditionally been well taken care of in terms of national
budgetary allocations. 148
The military was seen as the savior of stability and peace. However, there was also an
ingrained fear of authority, as evidenced through interviews of Guinean citizens, who
cited a fear of the authorities and crossing government officials and their collaborators as
a big motivation for their interactions with any authority—whether it be military,
governmental, or other. 149
Another key insight into the civilian-military relationship found within Guinea
during these years is found when analyzing the security situation surrounding the
country. Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, all neighbors of Guinea, were all
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undergoing violent, anarchic conflicts during this time. Interviews with Guinean citizens
in the late 1990’s indicates that the people of Guinea strongly preferred to maintain a
peaceful and stable environment even if that meant development objectives were pursued
at a slower pace.150 The presence of war-torn refugees, with Guinea having more refugees
than any other African country in the mid to late 1990’s further cemented the necessity
for Guineans to continue pushing for stability and peace, as Guineans knew there was no
easy path out of the country if flight were to become necessary. 151
As well, the Guinean military provided a substantial number of troops to assist in
quelling the violence occurring just past the borders—an estimated 50 percent of
Guinea’s army during this time period was occupied with either maintaining the security
of the borders or assigned to the ECOMOG mission operating in Sierra Leone. 152 The
importance of the military in protecting the country from the chaos abroad, as well as its
necessity in maintaining stability internally, naturally led to widely supported policies
that continued to keep the military happy—including large budget allocations,
celebrations, and more leeway in their interactions with other members of society.
Yet, by leaving military power unchecked, it often served as a force of injustice in
Guinean society. Oversight of military forces became a key issue of the Conté regime. As
a former general throughout the Touré regime, Conté remained the only active general
and, as president, determined all of the nation’s military policy. Nothing concerning the
military, or the military budget, would be delegated to the National Assembly. 153
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Furthermore, the public, conveyed frustration over continued corruption of police and
military forces, especially in terms of arbitrary detention and torture, unexplained
disappearances, bribery, and collaboration with bandits.154
While the 1993 elections formally switched the Conté regime from military
leadership to a democratically elected governance, the use of undemocratic processes to
limit the feasibility of opposition influencing governmental activities leaves the Conté
regime as a long-standing, military backed authoritarian regime, albeit less oppressive
than his predecessor, but still lacking in many opportunities for liberalization.155
The death of Conté brought another crisis extremely similar to that of Touré’s
death. An unclear line of succession meant the Guinea was thrown into uncertainty,
especially since it was clear that the potential future president could amass most power
for himself, using the last two long-lasting regimes as an example. A few hours after the
death of Conté, a group of army officers, led by Captain Camara, took power in another
bloodless coup, much like the one that brought the Conté regime to power. Once again,
Guineans welcomed the arrival of the new source of power and were hopeful about future
opportunities for growth. Camara, again much like Conté, suspended the Constitution and
governmental institutions. He also took it a step further by promising free and transparent
elections in the next year with a guarantee that the country’s candidates for that election
would not come from the military coup members.156 It initially appeared that Camara was
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using the security crisis stemming from the lack of successor to take power and advance
necessary democratic reforms.
However, a crisis soon returned as Camara began to exhibit clues that he would
be running in the next election cycle, leading to unrest among the civilian population.
This dissatisfaction led the planning of major demonstration in Conakry Stadium on the
28th of September in 2009 to oppose the possibility of Camara running for office, and
soon became the scene of a massacre. On the eve of the demonstration, the Minister of
the Interior announced that all future demonstrations would be banned, with no reason
given for the decision. 157
The resulting reaction from Guinean security forces as the 50,000-member rally
continued as planned was brutal. Witnesses first describe police officers blocking entries
and exits to and from the stadium, followed by the launching of tear gas grenades and
guns fired into the air. 158 Soon after, guns were fired directly into the stadium, people
were bayonetted as they attempted to flee, and many women were raped, both in the
street or whilst kidnapped houses. In only a few hours, more than 150 people were killed
by ammunition or bladed weapons, over 40 women were raped in public or in private
houses, more than 1500 people were wounded, with many others missing. Additionally,
many demonstrators were arrested and arbitrarily detained, many of them undergoing
torture. Witnesses recounted seeing attackers wearing the “red berets” of the Presidential
Guard, as well as other militiamen in civilian clothing committing other acts of violence.
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Witness statements provide a disturbing illustration of the violence and chaos of the

events:
We were surprised to see the ‘red berets’ appear in closed ranks. They opened fire
on the crowd in every direction. It was like a war film; I have never seen anything
like it in all my life. Someone told me to hide and so I hid underneath the seats. I
heard bullets whistling by. 160

Blue shirted soldiers [belonging to the gendarmerie] threw tear gas grenades into
the crowd. Immediately afterwards, the ‘red berets’ opened fire on the crowd and
people fell to the ground. People trampled the dead bodies underfoot in order to
escape. As I was running, there was a boy in front of me who had been stabbed in
the neck with a dagger. The blood spurted out, it was like seeing a cockerel that
has had its throat cut, running loose. The boy, who was wearing a white shirt, was
screaming as he lay on the ground with his arms and legs convulsing. Meanwhile,
the ‘red berets’ fired into the crowd, aiming at the head and chest. I heard one of
the ‘red berets’ say: ‘Open the gate, let’s get the bastards out of here’. People
rushed towards the gate but a ‘red beret’ grabbed a girl who was running away
and knocked her over, she struggled while he tried to undress her. Two other ‘red
berets’ came to help him, held her down and hit her with their black truncheons.
Another one undressed and raped her. 161

159

Ibid., 5.
Ibid., 10.
161
Ibid., 11.
160

63

The disastrous events of September 28th led to an end of the potential Camara
regime. While it is clear the military leader was attempting to continue the trend, begun
by Conté, of establishing a long-reigning, undemocratically uncontested presidency after
a bloodless coup, the events at Conakry Stadium ended any possibility for that future.
With heavy international outrage and pressure, fractures within the military leadership
worsened. In December, Lieutenant Abubakar Toumba Diakité, attempted to assassinate
Camara by shooting him point blank in the head. Evidence supports the theory that
Diakité tried to kill Camara due to fears that the blame for the massacre would be put on
him.162 Regardless of the intent, the result of the attempted assassination was the closure
of Camara’s involvement in Guinean politics, as he was moved to Morocco for treatment
and did not return back to the country afterwards.
The events of September 28th highlight a continuance of the issues of civilmilitary relations found throughout the Conté regime. The line between military/special
operations forces and local policing has been blurred throughout the years within
Guinean society, with the repeated deployment of military units alongside police and
gendarmerie against peaceful, unarmed citizens, resulting in most cases in unlawful
killings, excessive force, and arbitrary detainment. 163 Evidence collected after the attack
indicate that in the months after the death of Conté, recruitment policies for the
gendarmerie were lightened, and in order to rapidly expand the available gendarmerie
forces entrance tests were disposed of and training was lessened in order to more quickly
deliver more forces. 164 The military followed suit, with Camara and the CNDD
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reintegrating soldiers “under observation,” as well as previous soldiers who had been
dismissed for “alcoholism, desertion, banditry, drugs and undesirability.” 165 While these
decisions were made at the beginning of the Camara coup, they were certainly present
during Conté regime as well. Government officials have acknowledged that under
Lansana Conté “the rules governing recruitment into the armed forces were not
respected,” and that “the decision-making process is corrupted.” 166 This emphasis on
rapid, irregular recruitment with inadequate training and no detailed regulations of
security forces, especially in a society that puts them in high esteem, leaves a lot of
potential for the problems with harassment of civilian populations by security forces that
we have seen throughout Guinea’s development.

Analysis

A key issue of Guinean security present throughout all years of this analysis is the
oversight of military and police forces. This issue of oversight can be attributed to many
variables, and some of them are politically based. These political causes for the lack of
strong supervision can be separated into two categories: Guinean’s fear of limiting
military and police forces’ ability to maintain internal stability and the role of military-led
regimes in failing to effectively implement oversight of the security sector.
The first section focusing on Guinean’s personal beliefs surrounding sources of
authority has been alluded to in previous discussion. Throughout the years under Touré’s
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rule, he himself became a strong source of political instability within the country. Touré’s
intolerance, vindictiveness, and paranoia resulted in an internal climate of fear and
uncertainty, which led to the mass migration of Guinean’s to neighboring countries. After
his death, this climate of political instability lessened internally as Conté controlled
power through much less oppressive means, yet the regional climate further cemented
Guinean’s preference for stability without development over progress with instability.
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau became clear illustrations of anarchical conflict
with the complete collapse of the existing political system, contributing to the Guinean
people’s desire to maintain a peaceful environment to ensure continued stability, leaving
development objectives as a lower priority to the main goal of maintaining cohesion.
The military and police forces played a large role in Guinean’s views of ensuring
the continued implementation of this cohesion. Interviews undertaken while under the
Conté presidency illustrate the popular view that the military is the best guarantor of
stability, and their preference that public policies continue to keep the military happy and
ready to defend the unity of the country.167
As the public remained hesitant to control the force of stability for the county,
government incentives to oversee the military were never fully developed either. Under
Touré’s presidency, the role of police and military forces was to act as another hand of
the president’s authority. Conté, while he modestly attempted to establish some civilian
oversight of military forces, remained the country’s only active general and exclusively
determined military policy. 168 Given his role as a general before the coup of 1984, and
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given that he owed his position as presidency in part to the support of military forces of
his leadership, his impartiality in controlling this sector of society was suspect.
Predictably, evidence of the continued deregulation of security forces persisted
throughout the Conté years. Under his presidency, the rules governing recruitment into
the armed forces were rarely respected.
As well, Conté continued the policy of the Touré presidency of using military and
police forces interchangeably, most notably through using elite military forces in policing
and public order roles. Guinea has repeatedly seen the deployment of elite military forces
against peaceful, unarmed civilians, many of these forces never having received training
in proper use of lethal force. Additionally, police and gendarmerie forces, given the lack
of strong distinction between them and more lethal forces, have also visibly committed
unlawful killings and used excessive and arbitrary force against unarmed Guinean
citizens.169
This deregulation of military and police forces continued more aggressively after
the coup of 2008. Immediately upon taking power, Camara recruited hundreds of new
gendarmerie units without any entrance test, a requirement under the Conté years, and
shifted their training period to be much more rapid. 170 Camara also integrated back into
active rotation military forces that had been previously dismissed for reasons of
alcoholism, desertion, banditry, drugs, and undesirability. 171 Even further, military units
previously trained to defend the Guinean border against armed incursions from Liberia
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and Sierra Leone were moved into a new role overseeing large public demonstrations by
citizens.
Another issue of the security-politics relationship throughout Guinea’s existence
as a state has been the role of military coups in both hindering political evolution while,
in a sense, progressing it. The first successful military coup in 1984 was a finite end to
the Touré regime and the potential of the PDG to place another president in power and
continue governing with little to no change from the previous administration. In this
sense, the military coup was a means of progress for the Guinean state. It allowed the
Conté regime to begin which, while it used undemocratic means to maintain its hold on
power, was a big liberalization from the previous twenty-six years. Under the Conté
administration, Guinean civil society developed, including the presence of political
parties, opposition, NGOs, elections, freedom of press, and the ability to publicly show
dissent.
The Camara military coup of 2008 had a similar role in Guinean society. With the
successful coup, Conté’s associates could not appoint another president who could
continue to dominate politics similarly to the twenty-four years under Conté. With the
coup, an end of that period of Guinean politics also resulted. While Camara did not
directly liberalize the political scene within Guinea, the change in regime allowed
Guineans to begin demanding things that they had previously not demanded under the
previous administration—most predominantly the demand for free and fair elections with
candidates that were separate from the military body that had originally taken power. And
even though Camara fought, quite violently, against these demands, it was his excessive
use of force that ended his presidential run and forced the military coup leaders to appoint
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a non-related opposition leader as the head of the provincial government, which led to the
elections of 2010 where a non-military president was finally elected.
However, this use of military coups as a means of liberalization was most likely a
side effect, or at least not the main purpose, of the coups initial intent. Both coups, with
Conté being successful and Camara being unsuccessful, were attempts to set up longlasting, inherently undemocratic regimes. While Conté had opened up Guinean political
life to include opposition, free speech, and civil society, he did not open it up so much
that any of these new aspects of political life in Guinea could pose a direct threat to him
in upcoming elections. And Camara, while initially advocating for a separation between
military coup associates and the transition to civilian governance, decided to use the
opportunity to attempt a similar shift as Conté had done. It had become a cycle of
military coups with small political liberalizations with each new regime, but overall a
lack of effective political change as each administration only changed what was palatable
to its hold on power.
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Chapter 5: Senegal

Political Development

Senegal has had a significantly different political development process than the
other two countries presented in this analysis. While a single-party regime in the opening
years of the country’s existence, the amount of control that Senghor and the UPS were
able to exert over Senegalese society was much lower. While Senghor did have a lot of
political currency at the nation’s conception— “Senghor…is the great Senegalese leader.
He is political power in Senegal. Moreover, he is the secretary-general of the ‘dominant’
party, the UPS. Nothing can be done in Senegal against his open opposition. One can
even imagine that with the support of the masses (which he has acquired completely)
Senghor imposes his point of view on the other branches of the government” 172—there
were more limits imposed on his authority than the other dominant rulers in our
comparative African states. Senegalese society itself imposed many of these limits. Five
major problems at independence—a dry land vulnerable to droughts, huge gaps between
urban and rural sectors, a reliance on a single major export crop (peanuts), the existence
of hugely influential wealthy religious leaders, and the continued presence of French
influence over government and society—had a large role in limiting Senghor’s ability to
take risks in the political domain. 173 As well, the ruling party, UPS, had less cohesion
than other nationalist parties of the era. The UPS was more of an all-inclusive coalition of
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political forces, rather than a strong party capable of mobilizing the masses in pursuit of
national development goals. 174 Since Senghor focused on bringing different political
opinions under the overarching fold of the UPS, and not on indoctrinating the various
factions of the party into his specific ideology, the UPS acted more as a federation of
political movements rather than a proper, unified party. 175
Additionally, the nation’s first constitution did not set up a presidential regime,
but rather a parliamentary system with a bicephalous executive. The inaugural
constitution defined the position of President under a seven-year term, with the delineated
roles of the office including being the chief of the army, presiding over cabinet meetings,
and, with approval, appointing upper civil servants and army officers. The president
circulates the law, and can send a proposed law back to the National Assembly, but must
accede if the Assembly retains its point of view. 176 The prime minister, who is designated
by the president, has more extensive powers, including determining the nation’s policy,
directing the actions of government, assuring the execution of the law, national defense,
and the direction of the administration and armed forces. The National Assembly, whose
members are elected for five-year terms by direct universal suffrage, has the power to
vote in laws and the budget, as well as ratifying treaties and international agreements. 177
Naturally, the implementation of this constitutional organization differed slightly
from its description. Senghor retained a decent amount of political power due to his
leadership of the UPS party, which was the only party in the National Assembly, as well
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as his appointment of someone who was an ally, Mamadou Dia, to the role of Prime
Minister. Dia was quite apt at retaining powers in his position as Prime Minister, which
in the constitutional description is quite the important role, by reserving for himself key
ministerial posts in important sectors for financial, economic, and administrative services.
Senghor entrusted his associate with the day-to-day responsibilities of state
administration, while he concentrated his own attentions on the relationship between
Senegal and metropolitan France as well as on interterritorial politics within newly
independent West Africa. 178
The National Assembly, while given immense power through the constitution, did
not wield that power effectively in these foundational years. Comprised of solely UPS
members, the ability of representatives to control the political agenda and push back
against party lines was limited. Interestingly, since the Assembly representatives were
elected in large electoral districts (rather than a single national list) they did retain a focus
on representing their own regional focuses in the National Assembly, since smaller
regions had a lot of power in deciding who represented them. This meant that individual
representatives were more likely to push back on the government’s decisions that were
harmful to their region. 179
Another key difference in the Senegalese regime was the absence of a de jure
single-party status, though a de facto one-party system was established. Senghor, a
master of brokerage style politics, a crucial skill in the Senegalese political domain, had

178
179

Shumacher, Politics, Bureaucracy and Rural Development, 61.
Milcent, “Senegal,” 120.

72

absorbed or co-opted all serious opposition under the umbrella of the UPS party. 180 The
UPS did not attempt to control the totality of the nation’s life, unlike Touré’s PDG.
Youth and labor movements were allowed to grow independently of the party, militant
and extreme views were debated within the party congress, and perhaps most
importantly, the party did not give direct orders to the government; representatives of the
government, while still all members of the UPS, were more independent in their
governmental roles.181
In terms of opposition, however, a de facto one-party regime was created through
the UPS’ use of persuasive and coercive strategies to ensure the absence of feasible
organized opposition to the UPS’ control over government institutions. 182 The major
opposition party, PRA-Senegal, faced heavy discrimination in the first decade of the
state’s existence. The party’s freedom of maneuver was greatly restricted, the
government censored all media that published pro-PRA material, and it was nearly
impossible for the party to hold public meetings. Additionally, several members of PRASenegal’s leadership were arrested in 1961. 183 This limiting of the opposition’s access to
the public, as well as harassment from the state, established the de facto single-party
system even though the presence of opposition parties was legal.
In 1962, a crisis brought on by the split between Prime Minister Dia and President
Senghor led the major changes in the balance between the political institutions found
within the inaugural constitution. The break between the two allies was brought on by
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supporters of President Senghor voicing their suspicions of Prime Minister Dia’s
expansion of power within his governmental role, which they saw as leading to a
potential coup. At the end of 1962, the relationship between the two, and their respective
supporters, had grown increasingly strained, and ended with the arrest of Prime Minister
Dia for his political oversteps. 184
In the following year, the constitutional system was altered to address the
problems of the bicephalous executive that were proven unworkable. The new
constitution of 1963 instituted a much stronger presidential system, with the abolition of
the role of Prime Minister and the investment of all executive power into the hands of the
President. The increased powers of the president included the following: the elaboration
and implementation of all national policy; many increases in law-making and executive
rule-making authority; and new powers in policy initiation, formulation, and
implementation.185 Furthermore, the electoral process was changed to create a single,
nation-wide winner-take-all system based on a party list, strengthening the one-party
structure already established within the country. 186 The regime had moved a large amount
of governmental responsibilities and roles into the executive branch, which was now
solely occupied with the role of the President, and weakened the role of the already
uninfluential National Assembly.
The first major liberalization of the one-party system came in 1974, when the
Senegalese government passed a series of regulations that weakened the limits on
registering political parties. This reform came about after a series of protests from both
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urban centers, predominantly student groups, and rural sectors, predominantly peasant
farmers, forced the UPS to adapt and reform the electoral system. 187 Senghor himself
even acknowledge the overcentralization of power, announcing in an official statement
that the constitution of 1963 had “too often provided all agents of the State with an easy
pretext to unload their responsibilities onto the president of the Republic.” 188 These first
amendments reestablished a government headed by a prime minister, though the
restoration stopped short of creating another bicephalous executive. The aim was to
deconcentrate presidential power, increase the responsibility and authority of cabinet
ministers, and upgrade the role of the National Assembly. 189
In 1976, a more concrete liberalization of the system was passed with the
establishment of a de jure three-party political arrangement. The UPS was given the
preferred “social democratic” slot; the urban-oriented coalition led by Abdoulaye Wade
received the more conservative “liberal democratic” slot; and the more extreme,
previously banned Marxist party, the PAI, was given the “Marxist-Leninist” slot. This
change, while a move towards democracy, was still labeled “democracy on a leash,” as
the three slots were defined to make the UPS the preferred party with voters, as well as
decrease the opportunity for opposition to create a coalition that might oust the dominant
party.190
Even with the establishment of codified opposition (though disadvantaged), the
UPS was able to stay in power for another twenty years. Senghor decided to step down in
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1981, handing over the reins to Abdou Diouf, who was his Prime Minister at the time.
The resignation was seen as a politically advantageous move for the PS, as the law of the
country allowed Diouf to stay in the role of president until the next election cycle in
1983, giving him two years to benefit from his unelected position to build up his support
base and create a legitimate argument for his long-term presence in the presidential office
when the time for elections came around. 191 Diouf’s term in power was highlighted by
the decision to end the restrictive policy on opposition parties, opening up the party
landscape. However, the Diouf regime continued to further restrict election regulations,
while abolishing the presidential term limits that Senghor has implemented in the
liberalizations of the 1970s. 192
In 2000, a major shift in Senegalese politics arrived with the election of
Abdoulaye Wade of the PDS party to the presidency, the first peaceful handover of the
presidency from one party to another in all of Africa. 193 This alternance was initially
lauded by the international community as the mark of true democratic progress for the
state, yet it soon became apparent that this progress was easily derailed. Wade, rather
than building on progress of the previous decades of political liberalization and
democratic institutional progress, reversed course by draining institutions of their
substance and stripping the other branches of government of their powers, making them
impotent.194 Many of his actions after taking office have been implemented with the
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intent of helping himself stay in power, at the cost of many of the functional aspects of
the democracy.
One of the key issues of the Wade regime was the weakness of opposition. After
the alternance, the PS became the major opposition party. Its influence was quickly
decimated by defections, with key party membership joining the PDS in order to maintain
their access to state resources. After Diouf ended the limit on the number of opposition
parties, a jump in diversity was seen. Yet, by 2000 this had become a weakness of the
Senegalese political regime, with many parties acting as “telephone-booth” parties—tiny
organizations with few members that haphazardly participate in elections. 195 Wade was
able to take advantage of this system, offering opposition parties incentives to join the
majority coalition which inhibited the motivation for opposition to actually oppose the
actions of the majority party. 196

Security Crises

For Senegal, the main security crises throughout the country’s development has
been centered in the Casamance region, where rebels have maintained efforts at secession
for decades. Yet, internationally the conflict has not gained much attention, and
domestically the conflict has had little effect on the political development of Dakar-based
politics. The conflict began at the end of 1982, when demonstrators in Ziguinchor
publicly demanded independence, attacked the Senegalese flag, and chanted slogans
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against the central government. 197 The Senegalese government quickly reacted with
political oppression and military intervention, including the arrest and sentencing of the
movements leaders for threatening national integrity. 198 This initially small uprising has
turned into a long, protracted confrontation between the Senegalese state and the MFDC
(Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance), which has continued, though at times
seemingly resolved, until the present day.
The reasons for independence are varied depending on which source, and which
lens—economic, political, historical, etc.—is taken. It can be argued that the issue of
independence for the Casamançais began with the arrival of the Portuguese and has
continued in some form into the formation of the Senegalese state. Father Diamacoune, a
leader within the movement, has presented this argument, declaring that Casamance has
fought for 348 years for its independence, against the Portuguese, the French, and the
Senegalese, and is only continuing a fight which began pre-imperialist intervention. In his
view, the Casamançais have been in active conflict for 306 of those years, and in passive
conflict for 42 of them, including in the colonial and post-colonial periods.199
For leaders like Father Diamacoune, the Casamance region is distinct from the
rest of Senegal. With a different climate, different fauna and flora, and different majority
ethnic group, there are many visible differences which can form the base of a separatist
movement. The Jola200, a predominantly catholic ethnic group is quite separated from
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their Wolof-speaking, Muslim neighbors who dominate the social and political spheres of
society.
Another large problem is the physical separation of the region from the rest of the
country. As illustrated by the image below (Figure 1), Casamance is located underneath
the Gambia, which can impede efforts to easily access the region. Transportation between
Dakar and Casamance is limited to three options: a boat from Dakar to Ziguinchor, a
route through the Gambia which can be difficult due to issues of crossing international
borders, or even delays due to blockages in crossing the Gambian river, or going around
the Gambia, which can add a large amount to the travel time between the two entities.
Transportation is not always feasible between the two as well, there have been issues
with the maritime route, which is the most efficient method of travel, after naval
accidents, causing the region to fluctuate in its accessibility.

Figure 1: Casamance Region of Senegal 201
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Another argument for the causes of the conflict focuses, rather than distinctness of
Casamance from the rest of the country, on the access of the Casamançais to the
resources of the state. The Senegalese state has been accused of restricting access of Jolas
to important posts and responsibilities, taking land that has been traditionally Jola owned,
attempting to penetrate local society, and forcing the loss of Jola identity.202 Perhaps most
importantly, many accusations center on the failure of Senegal to invest and develop the
region, with many economic incentives and programs focusing solely on Dakar and the
areas surrounding the capital city. 203 Economic programs initiated in the region tend to
monopolize the agricultural market, lower the prices for crops, and interfered negatively
in rural production, all things which would negatively affect the villagers who rely on
agricultural means to support themselves.204
In 1998, a meeting between one of the MFDC’s leaders, Father Diamacoune, and
the Senegalese First Lady, Elizabeth Diouf, represented a symbolic attempt to illustrate
dialogue between the secessionist movement. The conversation that followed illuminates
clearly the narrative of each side:
ED - “Mister l’abbé, I know that you just celebrated your birthday on the 4 th of
April. I wish you a happy birthday. But the 4th of April, it is also the day of
Senegal’s national holiday. You are thus the most Senegalese of the
Casamançais.”
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FD - “I thank you, Madame President. But here, we have a problem, it is the
Senegalese army.”
ED - “You must take action in favor of peace.”
FD - “It is not me, Madame President, who asked for the war. It is you and your
army who impose it on us.”
ED - “You are a man of the church, a man of peace, you must fight for peace. I
consider you a friend. The army isn’t here except to protect the population.”
FD - “It is the contrary: the rebels do nothing except defend themselves. You
must, before anything else, give the order to your army to retreat from
Casamance.”205

Throughout this conversation one can see how the opposing sides construct their
own perspective on the conflict. For the First Lady, she begins by asserting the
“senegality” of Father Diamacoune, and then transitions into her assertion on wanting
peace, if only the rebels would stop resisting. For Father Diamacoune, who doesn’t
directly respond to his supposed senegality, his narrative surrounds the image of
Senegal’s army intruding on an otherwise calm state. For him, the future potential of
peace between the two entities is the removal of the Senegalese military presence in the
region. Interestingly, the issue of the actual separation of the Casamance region is not
discussed, potentially due to the irreconcilability of both sides to the view of the other.
After the initial confrontations between the Senegalese state and the rebels took
place in 1982 and 1983, which led to the deaths of over one hundred people, the
205
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Senegalese state attempted to take a more ambiguous, less confrontational stance on the
region in order to lessen the ability of the MFDC rebels to recruit new soldiers. However,
while the government attempted more diplomatic means of solving the conflict—such as
hiring young Casamançais to work in local bureaucracy and setting up a committee of
wise men to discuss underlying causes—there were also continued efforts to punish rebel
movements, including increased repression and the monitoring of suspected supporters of
the MFDC and key members of the Jola community. 206
The effect of the conflict on the general population of Casamance has been
extremely large. Civilians face insecurity from both sides, dealing with abuses from the
rebels themselves as well as the Senegalese army. Interviews with refugees in
neighboring Guinea-Bissau reveal a complicated view of both rebel movements and the
Senegalese army. One refugee details experiences with the army coming into their village
and demanding knowledge of hidden rebels. When no one responded, the army resorted
to shooting randomly, killing women and children, and causing the rest of the village to
flee.207 Another refugee describes hostility towards the rebels themselves, who many
refugees see as an instigator of the violence that forced them to leave their homes. 208
A comprehensive report by Amnesty International supports these views.
Interviews conducted for this report relay many abuses on both sides. Amnesty has
condemned the Senegalese army for their mistreatment of civilians, use of torture,
unexplained disappearances, and ignorance of judicial rights. Also included in the report
is abuses from the MFDC, including deliberate and arbitrary killings, especially of those
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who were suspected of helping the Senegalese army, and the rebel group’s harassment of
civilians, which includes the use of beatings, arson, and murder to get civilians to
relinquish food, money, and even new recruits.209
While the Amnesty report condemns both sides of the conflict for their abuses
towards civilian populations, the report especially condemns the Senegalese army itself,
by arguing that “these massive violations of human rights cannot be explained away as
‘regrettable errors,’ since the Senegalese army is unanimously seen as a well-structured
and well-disciplined army…. Senegal itself proudly claims to have republican security
forces that obey the orders of the political authorities.”210
The conflict has also seen a large variation in the level of violence and military
confrontation throughout the years. In the beginning years of the conflict, the capability
difference between the army and the rebels was striking. Descriptions of the MFDC at its
conception portrays a group of men traveling on foot in simple jeans and T-shirts, most
often illiterate, using old worn-down guns. Compared to the well-armed Senegalese
army, with access to armored vehicles, helicopters, and airplanes and forces that vastly
outnumbered the rebels, the MFDC was not an existential threat in any capacity. 211
Yet, after years of confrontation predominantly marked by violent public
demonstrations and governmental suppression, the MFDC launched a more armed-based
struggle in 1990 with increased attacks on military targets and civilians who were
suspected of collaboration with Senegalese authorities.212 This shift also came with a
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surge in weapons capabilities for the MFDC, which gained access to heavy weapons and
rocket launchers. 213 It is commonly assumed that the MFDC acquired these weapons
through the neighboring Guinea-Bissau, which after ten years of independence conflict
had become an demonstrated arsenal for weapons. Given the presence of predominantly
Russian and Cuban arms within the arsenal of the MFDC, it is safe to assume that the
weapons were bought through Guinea-Bissau, though through private operators, not
through the Bissau-Guinean state.214 In 1997 the first mine appeared in the conflict, after
an attack by the MFDC killed ten civilians and wounded thirty-five. Mines became a
useful tool for the outnumbered MFDC; after the first mine attack in November 1997,
there had already been dozens of deaths and more than 150 wounded by mines attacks by
May of 1998.215
Throughout the conflict there have also been many attempts at peace, but certain
aspects make stable peace difficult to achieve. One of the biggest causes is the difficulty
in discerning who is the leadership in the MFDC, and how much control selected
leadership has over the rebel troops. Multiple ceasefires agreements have been negotiated
through Father Diamacoune, a leader of the separatist movement, but scattered rebel
groups often are not notified of the updated engagement status or choose to ignore the
leadership of Diamacoune. During the Diouf presidency, a close friend of the president
revealed the struggle of negotiation, even when it was the will of the central government
to work through the conflict through dialogues: “Talk to the rebels? But we have asked
only for that. The problem is that we do not know with whom to negotiate. They are
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everywhere, and they are nowhere.”216 Another source alludes to Diamacoune’s tenuous
hold on the other rebels, asserting that after he was placed on house arrest in the initial
years of the conflict he lost both his credibility and his influence over the other resistance
fighters.217
And while Dakar, the international community, and rebel leaders may agree upon
certain ceasefire or de-escalation arrangements, controlling rebel groups, and in some
cases the Senegalese army, can be complicated in the region. Rebels know the land and
climate, can live with local populations, and find refuge in the forest whenever necessary.
With no structure to the wandering rebel bands, even if certain rebel factions support
negotiations towards peace, there remains the possibility of those who disagree
continuing to move the conflict forward.
An especially adept illustration of this issue is shown through a peace treaty
signed by both parties in 2004, when Father Diamacoune, then Secretary-General of the
MFDC, and Mister Ngom, Senegalese Minister of Home Affairs, signed an accord in the
center of Ziguinchor. While hailed as a historic moment for peace, and thus extensively
covered by the Senegalese national media, the peace treaty was not a comprehensive end
to the conflict. The event was a political victory for President Wade, but not presented as
“his” peace treaty, as he did not attend the signing nor arrive to the event until after the
signing was over. This illustrated his desire to convey a clear message that the treaty was
signed between a Minister of Home Affairs and an insurgency leader, not between two
heads of states.218 As well, Father Diamacoune’s authority over all of the rebels was
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uncertain. Multiple factions within the MFDC refused to recognize him as SecretaryGeneral, and they followed in refusing to recognize the peace agreement. 219 Attacks and
conflict have continued past this event, with soldiers dying in clashes with rebels in
2010220, 2011221, 2013222, and even into the current year, 2018.223

Analysis

Senegal presents a completely different case than the other two previously discussed
within this text. With both Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea, the major security crises mirror the
political development of the country. However, with Senegal, security crises and political
development appear to be almost entirely separate. Casamance, though it has been a longrunning secessionist conflict within Senegal’s borders, has not had a major effect on the
political development of the central government.
A key difference between Senegal and the other two case studies presented above
is the process of political development itself. In Guinea, the political climate of the
country post-independence has been long period of stagnation or even regression
followed by a burst of instability and moderate political change. Touré’s regime was a
regressive political development period, followed by a burst of instability with the Conté
coup of 1984. The burst was followed with further stagnation until 1990 when elections
were first held, yet the democratic process remained uncompetitive and Conté’s power
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was virtually unchecked throughout the rest of his presidency. 2008 became the next
eruption of uncertainty with Conté’s death and the subsequent military coup of Captain
Camara, who committed a massacre against his own people in his attempt to solidify his
hold on power. This massacre led to meaningful political development with the handover
of power from military leaders to civilian-led provisional government. Each political
progression is a direct consequence of a security crisis; without any kind of threat, there
is little to no political development throughout the country’s existence up until 2010.
Côte d’Ivoire has a similar relationship. While early political developments within
the country were instituted under the leadership of Houphouët-Boigny in reaction to the
economic recession lessening his hold on total power, such as the opening of the country
to elections, later developments, most importantly the end of the political exclusion of the
north, developed in response to the use of violence to catalyze the change.
In Senegal, political change has not been a result of security crises. In fact,
governmental reactions to public protests has been a much bigger explanatory factor to
progression in the governmental institutions of the country. The opening up of the singleparty system came in 1974, after the Senegalese government reacted to protests from
students in urban centers and farmers in rural centers demanding change. Senghor
stepped down from power through his own volition in 1981, and did so at a time where
his successor could advantageously take advantage of the election cycle to build up a
foundation for his presidency before he had to face the uncertainty of the vote. This led to
a stable Diouf presidency until 2000, when the governmental systems allowed a peaceful
transfer of power into the Wade presidency and the shift from the dominance of the PS to
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the PDS. These evolutions were the outcomes of either public demand or the initiative of
the politicians themselves, there were not security elements to catalyze the changes.
If one takes the lens of public protest as a threat of future violence, then protest as a
means of political change through security concerns can be considered. However, public
protest is still not entirely a threat to the state unless certain evolutions take place within
the protest movement that intensify its potential for instability, which varies based on the
amount of the population that protests, the ability of the movement to endure over time,
and its potential to control the authority of the central government through force.
As well, certain aspects of the conflict have affected its ability to push for change at
the national level. As previously discussed, Casamance is a particularly isolated region
within Senegal. The existence of Gambia, a sovereign state, in the center of the country
and the added difficulties of getting to Casamance without crossing Gambia due to issues
of infrastructure means that issues plaguing the region seem especially disconnected from
the rest of the country. This issue is heightened by the fact that the secessionist movement
is often strongly associated with the Jola ethnicity, which only constitutes around 5
percent of the population. 224 Considering the dominance of the Wolof ethnic group,
combined with the fact that other ethnic groups within Senegal feel no strong allegiance
to the Casamançais movement, there isn’t much geographic or cultural strength to the
conflict’s ability to influence other entities within the state.
As well, in the initial period of the conflict, the military capabilities of the
secessionist movement were insignificant compared to that of the Senegalese army.
Previous discussions have highlighted the state of the rebels at the conflict’s
224
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conception—barefoot men in t-shirts with old, worn-down guns—who posed no threat to
the well-armed central military and illustrated no potential to move the conflict out of the
region to threaten other areas of the country. Even as the rebel groups have evolved in
their weapons capabilities, they have kept the violence to the Casamance region,
centering attacks on visiting tourists, Senegalese soldiers, or other citizens of the
Casamance region.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion

Throughout this discussion, it has been clearly illustrated that, unsurprisingly, the
relationship between security crises and political progression is clear, and quite
complicated, in each case study. Whereas Côte d’Ivoire has one of the strongest links
between the two concepts, and Senegal has a less strong link in terms of the effect of the
security threat on governmental politics, what is common among the case studies is that
these predominantly internal security threats are political in nature, and the intended
outcome of those who wield violence or the threat of violence is to change a political
outcome.
Looking back on Barry Buzan’s definition of state sociopolitical cohesiveness,
many of the security threats discussed throughout the paper have fallen into his
delineated list of concerns related to sociopolitical strength. Recall that ordinary weak
states generally contain a governing power that is strong enough to override the domestic
environment with more primordial loyalties among the populace. Given that the citizens
of the state recognize the local loyalties more strongly than their national identity, the
central government tends to use military power and authority as a means to strengthen a
sociopolitical consensus on statehood. 225 Because of this strong emphasis on power and
authority, and less focus on the consent of the people in supporting an idea of nationhood,
challengers who want control of the state target weaknesses of government power in their
struggle for power. Security crises will this relate to this targeting, resulting in the
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common events of sociopolitical struggle in weak states: military coups, guerilla
movements, secessionist movements, mass uprisings, and political factionalism. 226 All of
these events target the government’s ability to maintain sociopolitical cohesion, either by
attacking the government’s ability to wield power (military coups), or the local
population’s willingness to let the government control the notion of statehood (guerrilla
movements, secessionist movements, mass uprisings).
Each state within this analysis has witnessed an attempt at breaking down the
government’s ability to maintain this sociopolitical cohesiveness. Côte d’Ivoire has
experienced a military coup that developed into a long-running internal conflict between
rebels and the central government. Guinea faced two military coups. Senegal has lived
through decades of secessionist conflict.
As well, each state witnessed the government’s reaction to these threats, which
became as much a security crisis for the population as the original threat itself. Citizens
of Côte d’Ivoire lived through the eight-year conflict, facing insecurity from the violence
between the government and rebels, as well as potential violence from Liberian funded
rebel groups coming in from the west. Guineans experienced mass oppression during the
Touré regime as he acted on his fears of losing his authority over the population. They
also faced the large public massacre as a result of Camara’s attempts to break down the
public protests, a threat to his use of power to uphold his government. Senegalese
citizens, particularly those who live in Casamance, face violence from both the rebels of
the secessionist movement and reactive violence from the Senegalese army, an issue that
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warranted a scathing report from Amnesty International on the abuse of military and
rebel personnel towards the inhabitants of the region.
From this theoretical lens, an analysis can be made surrounding the political
intents of the security threats as well. Côte d’Ivoire’s attempted military coup was an
attempt by the MPCI to take control of the central authority of the state so that they could
reinstate the ability of the north to participate in politics. When they were unsuccessful at
taking control of the major cities of the southern region of the country, the conflict settled
into a stalemate as each side waited for either a military means of achieving their political
goals, or an acceptable diplomatic resolution. As well, it can be argued that the concept of
Ivoirité and the resulting exclusion of the north was developed because Bédié and
subsequent political leaders did not have enough sociopolitical strength to maintain their
hold on power. The exclusion was a means of reinforcing a tenuous hold on authority by
the government.
Guinea’s military coups were often explained by the coup throwers as a reaction
to the poor governance of the previous administration; they were a reaction to the
previous administration’s abuse of its authority to maintain its hold on power. These
abuses were prevalent partially to compensate for the weaker hold on sociopolitical
cohesion of the Guinean government. Senegal’s secessionist movement developed when
a local minority within the country decided that the government, and the state of Senegal,
did not represent their national identity, and thus did not have the right to administer
them.
As well these security crises have interesting relationships to overall political
development; Côte d’Ivoire’s eight-year conflict led to a more democratic political
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process without northern exclusion and Guinea’s military coups resulted in slight
liberalizations in the new administrations and were an impetus for political change.
Meanwhile, Senegal’s Casamance conflict has not had a large enough impact to affect
government institutions in Dakar. When an ordinary weak state faces a threat to the
government’s ability to promote a certain idea of statehood—whether it be military coup,
secessionist conflict, or other—once the conflict has been resolved, the government’s
previous method of sociopolitical cohesion cannot be maintained.
Côte d’Ivoire’s government first used patronage, then the idea of Ivoirité, to help
the government maintain control over the entire country. Once the conflict had ended, the
state could not return to patronage nor Ivoirité to maintain a new idea of statehood, as
those had already proven too weak to impose unity in the absence of a strong national
identity. As a result, the state implemented new elections, with the political participation
of the northern half of the country, to establish a new government system that was strong
enough to impose unity on the entire state.
Guinea had a similar experience. First the government used extreme oppression,
then undemocratic processes and a strong respect for military forces, to help maintain the
central government’s hold on the entire territory. Each military coup broke down the
levers of power that the previous administration had used, and with each military coup
Guinean citizens grew bolder in what they were willing to demand from the government.
As such, Conté could not use extreme repression to maintain control, and Camara could
not use illegitimate electoral processes to continue his leadership of the country. After
Camara responded to this shift in authority with violence, which decreased the
government’s ability to control the population, a shift to a fair and more legitimate
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election was necessary to give the government a consensus once again that it could
decide what statehood meant.
Senegal presents in intriguingly unique situation in comparison. The government
never lost its ability to control the idea of statehood; it is a stronger state in comparison to
the other two case studies, potentially falling into the middle ground category outlined by
Buzan. While the secessionist movement has tried to dislodge the government’s authority
in the southern region, it has been unsuccessful in both that objective, and in enacting any
change in the central government’s institutions. As a stronger state, the government of
Senegal relies less on the use of authority and power to maintain Senegal’s statehood, and
relies more heavily on the consensus of Senegalese citizens with the government on the
idea of statehood. This, combined with the secessionist movements inability to threaten
the central government’s hold on power, results in a secessionist conflict that has not
resulted in large evolutions for the government itself.
Thus we reach an interesting conclusion. When a state lies on the lower end of the
spectrum of sociopolitical cohesion, making it a weaker state, large security threats result
in a shift of government institutions. These shifts are usually democratic in nature, as the
government needs to either increase its power to control the population, which is
weakened after facing a large threat, or attempt to become a stronger state. To become a
stronger state, the government must foster a stronger consensus between citizens and the
government on what the state is. This can be achieved by increasing political
participation, holding elections, and giving citizens a bigger role in their own
administration—all factors of political development as defined within this analysis. Once
a state becomes stronger on the sociopolitical spectrum, internal threats lessen their
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ability to attack the weakness of the country as a state, and security concerns began to
rely more heavily on external threats, the traditional view of security. While violence and
politics are inherently intertwined topics, they need not be as strong as some cases
explored within this analysis.
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